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Current topics of Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community
Protecting the 2025 Bundestag elections from hybrid threats and disinformation
Source: AdobeStock / frank peters
Elections are at the heart of our democracy. As such, they deserve special protection, especially from illegitimate influence by foreign governments. Countries with autocratic governments in particular make targeted attempts to influence voting behaviour in Germany, in order to make people question the legitimacy of our elections and undermine the public’s trust in democratic processes and institutions. Such hybrid attacks also aim at individual political figures. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and its executive agencies have ramped up the necessary protection measures.
Hybrid threats are on the rise
Germany has seen a significant increase in hybrid threats, including disinformation, in recent years. In November 2024, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence service, warned that foreign governments might try to influence the elections to the German Bundestag in February 2025. Disinformation and discreditation campaigns, cyber attacks, espionage and sabotage should be expected, the BfV warned.
What are hybrid threats? Hybrid threats are coordinated, illegitimate actions by state and state-directed actors to advance their own interests at the expense of another country without resorting to conventional military attacks. Hybrid threats affect every level of society and politics. They can combine various means (e.g. diplomatic, military, economic and technological) to achieve a coordinated campaign.
Disinformation is false or misleading information that is intentionally distributed. In terms of security policy, disinformation that is directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments is categorised as a hybrid threat.
Disinformation is already being used, in particular to attack individual political figures. False information and manipulation are used to discredit them. For example, many false reports about the private lives of politicians are circulating on the internet.
How disinformation spreads – false reports can quickly go viral
The methods used are often similar: false information is published on websites and is spread using fake social media accounts. Social media users can comment on posts and share them in seconds. As soon as the false or misleading information starts to circulate, its authors delete the website where it appeared first. But the disinformation remains and may continue to be shared online, in different forms, for many years.
The Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation (ZEAM)
As the supreme federal security authority, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community is coordinating the measures to protect the Bundestag elections against hybrid threats, including disinformation. When it comes to hidden influence exerted by foreign governments and the distribution of disinformation, operators of internet and social media platforms also play a key role. That is why Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser announced that another meeting with representatives of social media companies would be held at the federal ministry on 22 January 2025. The meeting will focus on possible measures to prevent the spread of punishable internet content and disinformation related to the Bundestag elections.
The Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation (ZEAM) is the Federal Government unit for the early detection of foreign influence and manipulation campaigns. ZEAM is the product of a joint initiative of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Justice, and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government. ZEAM’s objective is to protect Germany’s free and democratic constitutional system and its processes of political decision-making, such as elections, against manipulative and hidden influence by foreign countries. ZEAM is an important addition to the Federal Government’s measures to fight disinformation as a hybrid threat.
Measures to fight disinformation: The security authorities also have an eye on cyberspace
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) helps protect elections to the German Bundestag as one of its legally assigned tasks. Illegitimate influence and espionage are the traditional fields of activity of foreign intelligence services. The BfV monitors such activities in close dialogue with its national and international partners and informs the Federal Government and the public about possible threats. Working closely with other federal and state-level authorities and with input from international partners, the BfV created a task force for the Bundestag elections.
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) is responsible for issues related to cyber security. The BSI is providing information, assistance and advice to help federal and state-level election officers, candidates and political parties, for example to protect their social media accounts, digital identities and websites. The report on the state of IT security in Germany refers to current trends in this area and has a separate section on cyber security for elections.
Every one of us can help in combating disinformation. That is why the Federal Government has made prevention a priority. Increasing public awareness of disinformation and promoting public debate on how to deal with it are an essential part of this effort. Targeted work is carried out in all age groups to promote and increase their media and information literacy. The aim is to improve people’s ability to detect false information and reduce their vulnerability to disinformation.
Cooperation – with partner countries and in international networks – is another important element in addressing hybrid threats, including disinformation. And cooperation within the European Union (EU) is especially crucial.
Dialogue with the providers of online platforms is also key in fighting disinformation, because the operators of social media platforms play an important role in limiting the spread of false or misleading information.
Security for the Bundestag elections: The Federal Returning Officer
The Federal Returning Officer organises and supervises elections and election preparations in Germany at federal level. She is the official, nonpartisan source for information on the electoral process. She is also responsible for identifying and combating disinformation which is related to her remit or to the electoral process in general. Her team monitors the media in order to identify disinformation and counter it. This includes actively correcting false or misleading statements that are spread on social media regarding the Bundestag election process in Germany, for example.
The Federal Returning Officer also works with the Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB), which offers information on all aspects of political life, including Bundestag elections, and informs the public about disinformation and how to deal with it.
From the ballot box to postal voting: No possibilities for cyber attacks
A range of security mechanisms provided by electoral law ensures orderly elections and protects against manipulation. Voters can cast their ballots in polling stations or by post; only official ballot papers can be used for postal voting. Voting machines or online voting procedures like those used in other countries, which could be targeted by cyber attacks, are not used in Germany. The technical measures in place make it impossible to influence the final official results of the elections by means of cyber attacks.
Frequently asked questions about protecting the 2025 Bundestag elections from hybrid threats, including disinformation
Why is it necessary to protect the Bundestag elections?
The 21st German Bundestag will be elected in 2025. The German Bundestag is the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany; as the highest lawmaking body, it is the Republic’s most important institution. The Bundestag is composed of representatives of the German people who are elected every four years in general, direct, free and equal elections by secret ballot.
Guaranteeing parliamentary elections and carrying these out securely is extremely important for our democracy. Neutrality of the electoral bodies and the principle of open elections, which is constitutionally guaranteed, are fundamental for ensuring public trust in the organisation of elections and acceptance of the election results. All key steps in the electoral process are subject to public review.
Elections are the very heart of democracy, which means they deserve special protection. Most of all, elections must be shielded from foreign interference. Elections are often an occasion for foreign governments to increase their illegitimate activities to sway voters. Some countries, often those with autocratic governments, make targeted attempts to question the legitimacy of our elections in order to undermine the public’s trust in democratic processes and institutions. We must take decisive action to counter these threats.
What are hybrid threats?
Hybrid threats are illegitimate, often coordinated actions by state and state-directed actors to advance their own interests at the expense of another country, without resorting to conventional military attacks.
Hybrid threats target everyone living within a country, because these threats aim to influence public attitudes and intentions in the interest of a foreign government. Hybrid threats are intended to have a cognitive and communicative effect on their targets, to limit the government’s ability to act, paralyse political decision-making and weaken democratic processes and constitutional institutions.
Hybrid threats affect every level of society and politics. They can comprise a variety of means (e.g. diplomatic, military, economic or technological) to achieve a coordinated campaign. In some cases, it is difficult to identify individual incidents as part of a larger campaign and to respond accordingly.
The instruments used include disinformation; cyber attacks on government agencies and on companies; espionage; economic interference, for example through targeted investment in key industries; and sabotage, including of critical infrastructure.
What is disinformation?
Disinformation is false or misleading information that is intentionally distributed. This distinguishes it from false or misleading information that emerges and is shared in error or without the intention to deceive.
Those who distribute disinformation deliberately aim to deceive the recipients and to induce them to spread false and misleading information further. Disinformation is used for various reasons by non-state actors in Germany and abroad as well as by foreign state and state-aligned actors.
If a foreign government disseminates disinformation with the intent of exerting illegitimate influence on another country (or alliance of countries), this constitutes a hybrid threat. Such actions are intended to influence public opinion, to conceal and distract from the foreign government’s own activities, to generate strong emotions in controversial debates, to increase tensions in society, and/or to undermine trust in government institutions and action, with the aim of reinforcing the foreign government’s own position and pursuing its own interests.
Some foreign governments have been using their state media to spread disinformation for years, including in Germany. State-aligned media companies are not editorially independent; they are instead controlled by the government in question and are deliberately used for disinformation activities.
Global digital networks make it easier for foreign governments to spread targeted disinformation rapidly. For example, information may be manipulated or taken out of context for political motives, in order to influence public debate. The way that social media operate to enable information to be shared and distributed also allows false and misleading information to spread very quickly and reach a large audience.
Foreign manipulation and influence campaigns in the information space are particularly problematic. These government-orchestrated, internet-based campaigns use various agents working in a coordinated way to plant and spread the same false information through a range of channels. Technical means are used in such campaigns to artificially extend their reach and to make them seem more believable. For example, newspaper websites may be illegally copied, fake accounts created on social media platforms, and bots used for the automated spreading of content and manipulation of recommendation algorithms.
In addition, artificial intelligence makes it reasonably simple to create faked audio, image and video recordings (known as “deepfakes”) that can make politicians appear to say things they never said, for example. This is another way for foreign governments to influence our political discourse using manipulated information.
What is the Federal Government’s assessment of the hybrid threat situation in the run-up to the 2025 Bundestag elections?
The Federal Government is looking at various ways in which foreign governments seek to exert illegitimate influence, especially in opposition to Germany’s security interests or to interfere with the process of forming independent political views. Key political events such as elections can always become the target of undue influence by foreign powers seeking to pursue their strategic goals. The Federal Government assumes that some foreign governments may consider carrying out interference measures related to the 2025 Bundestag elections.Disinformation and discreditation efforts, cyber attacks, espionage and sabotage may be expected. These governments decide whether to use such measures and if so, in what form, based on opportunity and the relevant cost-benefit analysis.
In the context of the Bundestag elections, the amount of foreign disinformation circulating in Germany is likely to increase. It can be assumed that other countries will try to interfere with the public debate and the forming of political views. Since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022, in violation of international law, the Federal Government has seen an increase in disinformation from official Russian sources, government-controlled and pro-Russia media, and pro-Kremlin social media accounts.
The security authorities are not currently aware of any specific cyber attacks targeting the Bundestag elections. However, a wide range of cyber attacks has been seen in ahead of recent elections around the world. These attacks include what are known as hack-and-leak campaigns against political parties, in which personal data, emails and documents are stolen and published, in some cases after their content has been manipulated. Attacks on websites and servers hosting voter information or providing information about the election have also been attempted. Hacktivism for political motives has also increased in Germany since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and can go hand in hand with denial-of-service attacks on political party websites or events. These cyber attacks primarily affect information related to elections and cannot influence the actual process of voting at polling stations or by post.
The numerous current examples show that Russia, above all, could seek to exert illegitimate influence on the forming of political views ahead of the Bundestag elections in Germany, primarily through manipulation campaigns in the information space. However, the Federal Government is keeping a close eye on other countries, too.
In what ways might foreign countries try to exert illegitimate influence?
Ahead of the Bundestag elections, the main types of interference to be expected are foreign manipulation and influence campaigns in the information space. Foreign governments could spread false information, for example, to fuel emotionally charged discussions and to deliberately pit different groups in society against each other. Issues such as migration, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine or climate change could be exploited for this purpose, as these issues are often closely linked to socio-economic concerns. The targeted imitation of social media accounts or websites of individuals, political parties, media companies or authorities could be used to spread false and misleading information. In addition, images and audio and video files manipulated with the help of artificial intelligence (known as “deepfakes”) could be used to influence public opinion.
Foreign governments can also use cyber attacks to prepare and support disinformation activities. This means we must be prepared for what are known as hack-and-leak operations, in which data and information are stolen from the political sphere and made public. Material that is published in this way can also contain falsified or manipulated data particularly in order to discredit individuals or political parties. We can also expect attempts to gain access to the social media accounts or websites of people, parties, media companies or authorities in order to hijack these accounts and websites and use them to spread disinformation and propaganda.
With regard to the Bundestag elections in Germany, disinformation may be used to put political parties and individual politicians at a disadvantage. However, the attacks are not aimed at influencing voters to vote for a particular party. Rather, the objective is often to undermine trust in the legitimacy of the electoral process and the results of the elections, and therefore ultimately in democracy itself. In connection with the Bundestag elections, foreign governments could carry out, commission or reinforce the spreading of false or misleading information that aims to call into question the integrity of the election and the accuracy of the election results.
What is the Federal Government doing to protect the 2025 Bundestag elections from illegitimate foreign influence?
The Federal Government is pursuing a broad-based, whole-of-society approach to counter foreign interference in the Bundestag elections. This approach involves all of the federal ministries and their executive agencies. Communication among the federal, state and local governments and security authorities, and with civil society, is also key. Cooperation – with partner countries and in international networks – is important as well.
Headed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, the working group on hybrid threats coordinates the Federal Government’s strategic approach to hybrid threats. An interministerial and multi-authority task force on disinformation and other hybrid threats is the driving force behind the working group on hybrid threats. The work of the task force focuses first and foremost on ways to identify narratives, to reinforce pro-active, fact-based communication and to increase public resilience against threats from the information space.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community coordinates the measures to protect the Bundestag elections against hybrid threats, including disinformation. The task force, headed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, provides a forum for in-depth discussion across the different ministries and authorities. This involves close and ongoing coordination with the security authorities, the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Foreign Office and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government concerning the threat situation and the measures to protect the Bundestag elections. The authorities share information and act as needed. In this way, potential foreign interference operations aimed at influencing the Bundestag elections can be systematically detected and warded off. The task force also coordinates closely with the office of the Federal Returning Officer and with the Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB), which has compiled a range of specific information materials on the Bundestag elections.
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) assists the Federal Returning Officer and the returning officers of the federal states as well as candidates and political parties in matters of information security by providing a range of information, assistance and advisory services. The BSI’s work concerns, in particular, the protection of social media accounts, digital identities and websites, the use of artificial intelligence, enhanced observation of the situation and, if necessary, the provision of warnings, malware scans and incident support.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) helps protect elections to the German Bundestag as one of its legally assigned tasks. Illegitimate influence and espionage are the traditional fields of activity of foreign intelligence services. The BfV monitors such activities in close dialogue with its national and international partners and informs the Federal Government and the public about possible threats.
Prevention and greater resilience at all levels of government and in society as a whole are special priorities for the Federal Government. Increasing public awareness and promoting public debate on how to handle disinformation are an essential part of this effort. Targeted work is carried out in all age groups to promote and add to their media and information literacy. The aim is to improve people’s ability to detect false information and reduce their vulnerability to disinformation. Each and every one of us has a part to play in combating disinformation.
Cooperation – with partner countries and in international networks – is another important element in addressing hybrid threats, including disinformation. And cooperation within the European Union (EU) is especially crucial.
Dialogue with the providers of online platforms is also key in fighting disinformation, because the operators of social media platforms play an important role in limiting the spread of false or misleading information.
How does the Federal Government counter possible false or misleading information regarding the Bundestag election process?
Raising awareness and emphasising the principle of openness in the electoral process are the most important measures against disinformation. To counter disinformation, the Federal Returning Officer actively provides comprehensive information through a range of channels (including her website, social media, press releases and interviews) on preparations for the election, the running of the election and the rules in place to guarantee that the election and the counting of votes take place correctly and properly.
The Federal Returning Officer is the official, nonpartisan source for information on the electoral process. She is responsible for identifying and combating disinformation related to her remit or the electoral process in general. Her team monitors the situation in the media in order to identify disinformation and counter it. This includes actively correcting false or misleading statements that are spread on social media, for example about the Bundestag election process in Germany.
In addition, the Federal Returning Officer works with the Federal Agency for Civic Education, which provides a wide variety of information on all political topics and has compiled a range of specific information materials on the Bundestag elections. Through its social media accounts, the Federal Agency for Civic Education will address and discuss the Bundestag elections in different formats. Its Wahl-O-Mat tool can be used to learn more about the Bundestag elections. The Federal Agency for Civic Education has specific activities and services to explain the role and dangers of disinformation during the Bundestag elections.
Is the Bundestag election process secure, and is manipulation of the casting of votes and the counting of votes out of the question?
The Federal Returning Officer and all other electoral bodies are taking a wide range of measures to ensure secure elections, with support from the Federal Office for Information Security. In addition, various security mechanisms provided for in electoral law protect against manipulation and ensure that elections are carried out properly.
Voters can cast their ballots in polling stations or by post; only official ballot papers can be used for postal voting. Voting machines and online voting procedures like those used in other countries, such as the U.S., and which could be the target of cyber attacks, are not used in Germany.
Votes cast in polling stations and votes submitted by postal ballot are recorded in the electoral register, ensuring that each voter can only vote once. Election fraud is a punishable offence. Votes cast in polling stations and by postal ballot are counted by volunteer election assistants from among the electorate. Votes are counted in public, and the count can be reviewed by anyone who wishes.
When determining the final results, only express reports of the provisional election results on election night are transmitted electronically as well as on paper.Appropriate, state-of-the-art information security measures are in place to protect this sensitive data. In order to ensure that the provisional election results are determined correctly and on time, and to counter potential cyber threats, a joint federal and state working group of the Federal Office for Information Security worked with the state-level core team, the returning officers of the federal states and the Federal Returning Officer. In December 2022, they compiled a baseline protection profile (IT-Grundschutz-Profil) for information security when establishing the provisional results of national parliamentary elections. This profile has been updated for the 2025 Bundestag elections.
The final election results are established by the electoral committees of the constituencies and the federal states, and then by the Federal Election Committee, based on the election records of the electoral boards in the polling stations and the postal ballot board. The technical measures in place make it impossible to influence the final official results of the elections by means of cyber attacks. Where there are reasonable grounds to doubt the result, it is possible to conduct a recount of the results in polling districts.
How can I recognise false or misleading information and protect myself against disinformation?
a) Think critically instead of just sharing
False or misleading news items, images and videos are often shared by private individuals not because they want to cause harm, but because they are concerned. But such news items or images may help create uncertainty or spread panic. The more emotional or dramatic the content, the more often it is shared. That is why it is so important to remain calm and not to add to the confusion. Don’t share content without checking it first. And don’t share any content that seems questionable. This is especially important before elections.
b) Check sources and senders of information
It is always helpful to check questionable content against at least two other sources. Current news is available from the news media and daily and weekly newspapers and magazines. You can also consult the official websites and social media accounts of relevant institutions. Always check who published the video, image or news item. Is it the same person who created the content, or has the content already been repeatedly reposted by others? If a social media account uses the account holder’s real name, that can be an indication that the account is authentic. Platform providers may indicate whether individual accounts are independent or government-sponsored, which can also help in determining how reliable the content is. When using social media, rely on the verified accounts of official bodies and institutions. Look at the publication data of websites. It should include the name of the person responsible for the website, along with a full postal address, not just an anonymous email address, for example.
c) Use fact-checking services
Numerous research institutions, non-governmental organisations and independent media organisations pick up on news items and claims that are currently circulating and check them so that they can bring false information to light and correct it.
