



Bundesministerium
des Innern

Preventing corruption in the federal administration

Annual report for 2016

As at: 22 June 2017

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Development and results of corruption prevention in the federal administration Annual report for 2016

I. Preliminary remarks

As the result of the resolutions of the Auditing Committee of 7 May 2004, 28 May 2004 and 24 September 2004, the Federal Ministry of the Interior reports annually to the German Bundestag on the development and results of corruption prevention in the federal administration.

The report is based on a computer-assisted survey of all federal authorities. Every year, the questionnaire used for the survey is enhanced, taking account of the lessons learnt from the previous year, and technically refined.

The report starts with a summary of selected results (see II. below). This is followed by information on the authorities covered by the report and their staff (see III. below), the suspected cases of corruption in the reporting year (see IV. below), a report on the implementation of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration of 30 July 2004 (see V. below) and additional comments of individual authorities (see VI. below). The report ends with concluding remarks and an outlook to the annual report for 2017 (see VII. below). In the annex to the report specific information is presented and summarized in table form. Reorganization measures within the federal administration have affected the identification of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption also in this reporting year.

The report shows the executive agencies of the federal ministries, divided into

- higher level;
- middle level;
- lower level;
- legal persons under private law;
- federal courts and
- other bodies (which do not fit into one of the above categories).

Some information in this annual report are of a general character and are meant to facilitate understanding of the report. Therefore some information were already included in previous reports.

At the request of the German Bundestag, all annual reports - from 2013 - are published on the Internet after its referral to the German Bundestag (For the German version, please go to http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Moderne-Verwaltung-Oeffentlicher-Dienst/Korruptionspraevention-Sponsoring-IR/Korruptionspraevention/korruptionspraevention_node.html).

An English translation of the annual reports for 2014 and 2015 is available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Administrative-Reform/Integrity/integrity_node.html

II. Selected results

- This report covers 580,894 staff¹ in 930 authorities, workplaces and other bodies of the federal administration.²
- A total of 29 criminal investigations into 49 federal public officials on suspicion of corruption, typical related offences such as fraud, breach of trust or corruption-related breach of duty were opened and conducted in 2016. This means that in the current reporting year grounds for suspicion applied to 0.006 % of federal administration staff.
- In the current reporting year, 35 proceedings on suspicion of corruption, most of them from the previous year, involving 22 criminal proceedings, six disciplinary proceedings and two proceedings under labour law, were concluded. In 43 % of these proceedings, sufficient evidence of guilt was found to impose punishment or disciplinary measures against federal public officials.
- All supreme federal authorities – except the Federal Ministry of Defence – have current, reliable data on job areas which are especially vulnerable to corruption. The Federal Ministry of Defence is still involved in major restructuring, but has continued to gather the necessary data in the reporting year. By now, between fifty and sixty per cent of all areas of activity of the defence ministry have been reviewed.
- On the cut-off date for this report, reliable data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption were available for 96.2 % of the staff positions in the executive agencies of all federal ministries (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence). The Federal Ministry of Defence has made further significant progress in identifying jobs within its remit which are especially vulnerable to corruption also in 2016 (data gathered or updated for 278 workplaces in calendar year 2016 alone).
- During the reporting year, 10,881 employees in the supreme federal authorities (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence) worked in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. In the executive agencies of the federal ministries (not including the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence), a total of 43,096 employees worked in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. The procedure for identifying the number of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in the Federal Ministry of Defence has not been

¹ The number of staff is based on the information provided by the authorities in response to the survey. It includes the number of civil servants and employees without civil servant status in the federal administration, military personnel in the Bundeswehr and staff of other federal bodies (see at III.2).

² Note: To improve readability, the present guide does not use gender-neutral language in most parts (e.g. no differentiation between male and female titles). Terms used automatically imply equal treatment for both male and female. The decision to use the shorter male versions was taken on editorial grounds only and is entirely without prejudice to any gender.

completed yet. The reviews completed in the reporting year found that 328 ministerial staff members and 5,257 staff members of the ministry's executive agencies work in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption.

- At 90 % of workplaces within the remit of the Ministry of Defence and at 88 % of workplaces within the remit of the remaining federal ministries for which a risk analysis was considered necessary, this risk analysis has been carried out.
- For many years, the principle of job rotation, in which staff employed in areas especially vulnerable to corruption are rotated to different positions after no more than five years, has not usually applied. Ways need to be found of dealing with the loss of know-how when a post holder moves to another position, even in times of increasing complexity, as well as of ensuring the most efficient staffing levels possible. For the first time, in the current reporting period, it was also asked how long those employees, into whom investigations on account of suspected corruption had been initiated, had been in service. Neither an analysis of responses to this enquiry nor the findings of the Federal Criminal Police Office's 2015 National Situation Report on Corruption (see there p. 10) were able to provide any further insights. After several discussions among the federal ministries, it was agreed to complete the revision of internal corruption prevention regulations by 2017. The goal is to reflect changed framework conditions and to ensure implementation of the anti-corruption regulations in practice.
- All the supreme federal authorities have appointed their own contact persons for corruption prevention. Almost all executive agencies within the remit of the federal ministries have a contact person for corruption prevention. This holds true also for the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Defence, where 652 workplaces (of 677 reporting) within the ministry's remit have appointed a contact person for corruption prevention.
- Within the federal administration (including the remit of the defence ministry), corruption prevention was the task of 356.73 full-time equivalents. A total of 964 persons acted as contact persons for corruption prevention.
- In 2016, 234,330 federal administration staff received initial or follow-up corruption-awareness training, including 15,996 supervisory staff. In 2016, 557 supervisory staff served as trainers, instructors or advisers for corruption-awareness training.
- In 2016, 16,051 federal administration staff were enrolled in initial or advanced corruption-prevention courses which went beyond corruption-awareness training.

III. Key Data: Authorities and staff covered by this report

This chapter explains which (see no. 1 below) and how many (see no. 2 below) agencies and staff members are covered by the present report. This is followed by information on which agencies, workplaces and other bodies have not been covered in this reporting year and which ones were newly included.

1. General note

No. 1.1 of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration of 30 July 2004 applies to all authorities of the direct and indirect federal administration (i.e. the direct federal corporations, offices and foundations created for specific federal tasks) as well as the federal courts and special federal funds.

This report does not cover the social insurance institutions although in terms of administrative organization they are part of the indirect federal administration. According to the principle of self-government (Section 29 (1) of the Social Code, Book IV), federal administrative regulations pursuant to Article 86, first sentence, of the Basic Law which affect the core area of self-government do not apply to the social insurance institutions. The same is true of the Bundesbank. The Federal Employment Agency³, the German Federal Pension Insurance, the German Pension Insurance Miners, Railway and Maritime have voluntarily agreed to apply the Directive. They are therefore counted with the authorities of the direct federal administration within the remit of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs.

In this report, some executive agencies are included in the form of a summary because the relevant data are kept centrally or corruption prevention is centrally organized. Annex 1 shows which data were submitted for groups of executive agencies.

Because of the large number of staff within the Federal Ministry of Defence's remit, which would have distorted the overall results had their data been combined with those of the other ministries' remits, the Defence remit is described separately in certain places.

As in previous years' reports, information on the customs administration (remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance) is given separately in some cases.

³ The Federal Employment Agency provided the following data for the reporting period: the number of staff; the number of staff involved in corruption prevention; the contact persons for corruption prevention; the employees and senior staff who attended awareness-raising measures. As far as possible and useful, the data are included in the report.

2. Number of staff, authorities and other bodies

Data were compiled on 252 authorities and other bodies of the federal administration outside the defence remit having a total of 364,296 staff. As regards the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, data were compiled on 678 workplaces having a total of 216,598 staff.

These are broken down as follows into authorities, workplaces and other bodies of the supreme, higher, mid- and lower levels and into federal courts, legal persons under private law and other bodies.

Outside the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence

Level	Number of authorities / workplaces / other bodies	Number of staff
Supreme federal authorities (including Federal Constitutional Court, excluding Federal Ministry of Defence).	22	32,992
Higher federal authorities	69	76,652
Intermediate federal authorities	1	873
Lower federal authorities	108	75,673
Federal courts (not including the Federal Constitutional Court)	6	1,220
Legal persons under private law	12	8,470
Other bodies (e.g. foundations, corporations, self-governing bodies)	34	168,416
TOTAL	252	364,296

Remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence

Level	No. of workplaces	Number of staff
Supreme federal authority	1	2,793
Higher federal authorities	19	21,180
Intermediate federal authorities	116	47,069
Lower federal authorities	536	144,048
Federal courts (Bundeswehr disciplinary and complaints court)	2	41
Legal persons under private law	4	1,467
TOTAL	678	216,598

This report thus covers 580,894 staff in 930 authorities, workplaces and other bodies of the federal administration.

For linguistic simplicity, this report will refer to authorities, workplaces and other bodies as "authorities" when referring to all three together.

3. Scope of the report

The individual ministries checked to ensure that all authorities within their remit have been included, also using the Federal Government's report on participation. Some authorities covered by the report were included for the first time; as in previous reports, this report, does not cover most social insurance institutions (see 1 above) or certain authorities, workplaces or other bodies for the following reasons.

For details on the individual authorities, please see below:

a) Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

On 1 January 2016, the Occupational accident insurance fund for transport and traffic, post logistics and telecommunications was founded within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. It is a merger of the Occupational accident insurance fund for transport and traffic (remit of the labour ministry) and the Posts and Telecommunications Accident Insurance Fund (remit of the finance ministry). The new occupational accident insurance fund is not covered by the report, because it is a social insurance institution to which – in accordance with the principle of self-government – federal administrative provisions affecting the core of self-government do not apply (see also III.1 above).

b) Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance

The report does not cover the Bundesdruckerei GmbH, which is organized like a private company, due to the unique organizational and operational aspects which are incompatible with the underlying statistics. Since the Bundesdruckerei GmbH is no longer part of the public administration, it has been using a separate compliance system for several years that is based on the key anti-corruption standards and rules applicable to private businesses. Within the framework of this system, risks are systematically identified and evaluated and measures are taken based on such analysis. This kind of risk analysis is carried out every year and constantly enhanced. From the outset, it covered corruption risks. The Board of Supervisors of the Bundesdruckerei GmbH is the competent supervisory body and as such receives (quarterly) compliance reports. Moreover, an external auditing firm regularly reviews the adequacy and effectiveness of the Compliance Management System.

For the first time, the 2016 report covers the Federal Information Technology Centre (ITZBund). On 1 January 2016, the Centre for Data Processing and Information Technology (ZIVIT, executive agency of the Federal Ministry of Finance), the Federal Institute for IT Services (DLZ-IT, executive agency of the Federal Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure) and the Federal Office for Information Technology (BIT, executive agency of the Federal Ministry of the Interior) were merged and have since then been under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance.

The customs administration was also reorganized. On 1 January 2016, the General Customs Administration (GZD) went into operation. The intermediate federal authorities (Federal Finance Offices, the Customs Criminological Office) and the Federal Revenue Administration's Training and Knowledge Centre were merged into a superior federal authority, excluding operational-supervisory functions of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Due to the restructuring process, the GZD could not submit data for the 2016 annual report. The Federal Spirits Monopoly Administration will remain an autonomous superior federal authority within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance until the end of 2018 and as such is covered by the present report.

c) Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure

As in the previous year, Deutsche Bahn AG is not included in the report due to its special character as an international business enterprise. It is no longer part of the public administration and therefore has a separate compliance system in use based on the key anti-corruption standards and rules applicable to private businesses.

For the first time, the 2016 annual report includes the Central Command for Maritime Emergencies Germany which belongs to the remit of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure. It is a joint organization of the Federation and the federal states with coastlines and is responsible for North and Baltic Sea accident management.

d) Within the remit of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety

For the first time, the report includes that Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung mbH which was founded in 2016 and is one of the executive agencies of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety.

e) Federal intelligence services

The federal intelligence services (Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Bundeswehr Counterintelligence Office) are not included in the report, as in previous years, because doing so could reveal sensitive information, such as about the structure and methods of these services. The Federal Government reports on all matters only to the bodies of the German Bundestag which are responsible for oversight of the intelligence services.

IV. Cases of suspected corruption and proceedings concluded in 2016

The following section covers the cases of suspected corruption reported (see b below) and concluded (see c below) in the reporting year. To better understand this section, the relevant terms used in the Anti-Corruption Directive will be specified and a brief overview of the procedure in cases of suspected corruption will be given (see a below).

a) Definitions and procedure in cases of suspected corruption

There is no legal definition of the term corruption in German law. Criminological research offers some orientation, where the term is defined as follows: “There is no legal definition of the term “corruption” in German law. Criminological research offers some orientation and defines the term as follows: “misuse of a public office, a position in business or a political mandate in favour of another, either at that person’s request or on one’s own initiative to gain personal benefit or to benefit a third party, resulting in the occurrence or expected occurrence of damage or disadvantage to the public (in an official or political function) or to a business (concerning offenders with a certain role in business)”.⁴

In cases of suspected corruption, the Directive obliges the authority’s executive level (no. 10.1 of the Directive) and the contact person (no. 5.2 of the Directive) to take action: The contact person is expected to provide information and advice within the authority, while the authority’s executive level is expected to notify the highest service authority and take measures to prevent concealment.

The term “suspected case of corruption” is specified in the Handbook on the Working Practices of Contact Persons for Corruption Prevention of 20 September 2013⁵ (hereinafter referred to as “Handbook for Contact Persons”). According to this Handbook, suspected corruption means that actual and understandable evidence or information suggesting corruption emerges in written or oral form, by telephone or in any other way, also in anonymized form. There is usually no such evidence if a case is reported for clearly denunciatory purposes (cf. no. 3 of the Handbook for Contact Persons).

If a case of suspected corruption is reported, the contact person, agency management and personnel management take action. They initiate internal investigations, inform the

⁴ See Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office), the 2015 National Situation Report on Corruption, page 3, available for download at:

https://www.bka.de/DE/AktuelleInformationen/StatistikenLagebilder/Lagebilder/Korruption/korruption_node.html.

⁵ Available at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/ModerneVerwaltung-OeffentlicherDienst/Korruption_Sponsoring/handreichung_korruptionspr%C3%A4vention_verdachtsf%C3%A4lle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

law enforcement authorities (depending on the investigation result) and, in case of imminent danger, may take measures to prevent concealment. Depending on the authority's structure, the legal office, internal investigation units, the internal audit unit and/or the facility protection unit of the police may also take action (for detailed information on the tasks and rights of those involved, please see nos. 4 and 5 of the Handbook for Contact Persons).

The public prosecutor's offices are responsible for carrying out criminal investigations in cases of suspected corruption. First of all, they establish whether an initial suspicion exists and then decide whether or not they will initiate criminal investigations. A criminal investigation ends either with termination, a penal order or a bill of indictment sent to the responsible court. Termination may be considered if it was not possible to gather sufficient evidence (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure), if the offender's guilt was not considered great enough and there was no public interest in prosecuting the offence (Section 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) or if prosecution is ceased while imposing conditions and instructions upon the accused (Section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure). A penal order pursuant to Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be considered if, on the basis of the investigation results, the public prosecutor's office does not deem it necessary to initiate proceedings. In all other cases the public prosecutor's office will institute legal proceedings before a German court if the evaluation of the evidence provides sufficient grounds for suspicion (Section 170 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Usually, in the case of civil servants, the employer also initiates disciplinary proceedings when he informs the public prosecutor's office. Such proceedings are usually suspended while criminal proceedings are underway and are resumed afterwards. The disciplinary measure is based on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Civil servants are immediately suspended from service as soon as they are sentenced by a German criminal court to imprisonment of at least one year on charges of a deliberate crime (see Section 41 (1) no. 1 of the Act on Federal Civil Servants) or to imprisonment of at least six months on charges of deliberate accepting of bribes in the civil servant's primary position (see Section 41 (1) no. 2 of the Act on Federal Civil Servants). In such a case, the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the Federal Disciplinary Act will be discontinued (Section 32 (2) no. 2 of the Federal Disciplinary Act).

But even if the criminal proceedings are discontinued or if the court imposes a minor sentence of imprisonment, a disciplinary sanction may still be imposed. This has to do with the increased requirements imposed on civil servants by civil service law.

The following disciplinary sanctions are provided for in Section 5 (1) of the Federal Disciplinary Act (BDG):

- Reprimand (for more details, please refer to Section 6 of the BDG);
- Fine (for more details, please refer to Section 7 of the BDG);
- Reduction of remuneration (for more details, please refer to Section 8 of the BDG);
- Demotion (for more details, please refer to Section 9 of the BDG);
- Dismissal from service (for more details, please refer to Section 10 of the BDG).

In the case of public employees, the employer also initiates a disciplinary procedure under employment law when he informs the public prosecutor's office, but suspends it until the criminal proceedings are completed. However, the employer may impose sanctions (e.g. dismissal) even if the criminal proceedings are still ongoing.

The following measures may be taken against public employees in accordance with labour law:

- Informal warning;
- Formal reprimand;
- Dismissal with due notice (for reasons of conduct in accordance with Section 1 (2), second sentence of the Act Governing Protection against Dismissal.

- Exceptional dismissal (in accordance with Section 626 of the Civil Code)

A case of suspected corruption is concluded once a final decision has been taken under personnel, disciplinary and/or criminal law. Furthermore, a case of suspected corruption is concluded once the unit responsible for personnel and/or the public prosecutor's office have decided not to initiate (criminal) proceedings (cf. no. 3 of the Handbook for Contact Persons)

b) Overview of proceedings initiated in 2016

Criminal investigations⁶ into federal public officials

In the 2016 reporting year, in the direct and indirect federal administration a total of 29 criminal investigations into 49 federal public officials (civil servants, public employees, military personnel, external employees and other public service staff) were opened in connection with corruption offences in the narrower sense or with typical related offences such as fraud or breach of trust.⁷ In four other cases of suspected corruption, investigations of an unknown number of federal public officials were opened. In ten of these cases involving a total of 15 suspects and in one case involving an unknown number of suspects, criminal investigations were discontinued due to lack of evidence.

Disciplinary proceedings/ proceedings under labour law against federal public officials

In addition to the aforementioned criminal investigations, disciplinary proceedings or proceedings under labour law were launched against 22 federal public officials (eleven disciplinary proceedings, eleven proceedings under labour law). In another case of suspected corruption, only proceedings under labour law were initiated, i.e. no parallel criminal investigation took place. The proceedings were terminated before the reporting year came to an end, because the internal investigations already exonerated the person concerned. In another case, disciplinary proceedings were also terminated before the end of the reporting year. Of the nine proceedings under labour law which were also terminated in the reporting year, three ended with a warning and six with the termination of the employment relationship (dismissal, contract of annulment, termination of the contract by the employee).

Interim results

In the 2016 reporting year, 36 federal public officials – or 0.006%⁸ of federal administration staff – were suspected of having been involved in corruption-related offences (27 cases).

Criminal investigations into third parties

Furthermore, in the 2016 reporting year criminal investigations into seven third parties were opened in connection with corruption offences in the narrower sense or with

⁶ Including investigations by the Federal Police

⁷ Compared to 28 criminal proceedings in 2015, 19 in 2014 and 2013, 12 in 2012, 34 in 2011 and 31 in 2010.

⁸ The quota is based exclusively on criminal proceedings including proceedings terminated pursuant to Section 153 (Non-Prosecution of Petty Offences) and Section 153a (Provisional Dispensing with Court Action; Provisional Termination of Proceedings) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not include proceedings terminated pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (lack of evidence) and proceedings against third parties outside the federal administration, i.e. givers of bribes.

typical related offences such as fraud or breach of trust. Third parties in this sense are persons who tried to bribe federal public officials or grant them advantages and who were reported to the police by those approached. In two other cases of suspected corruption, investigations into an unknown number of third parties were opened.

aa) Federal Foreign Office

i) Proceedings against federal public officials

The Federal Foreign Office reported 22 new cases of suspected corruption involving a total of 25 federal public officials. Details:

- **Issuing of visas:** Sixteen cases occurred at German visa offices abroad and concerned the issuing of visas. In all cases a third party was suspected of having tried to influence the staff at visa offices abroad in order to obtain a visa or be given an appointment to which the applicant was not entitled. Local employees (a total of 17 persons) were suspected in 13 of these cases under suspicion and an official from the Federal Foreign Office in one case. In three cases, investigations of unknown local employees were opened.

In all cases, either preliminary investigations by the Federal Police or investigations by the public prosecutor were carried out.

During the reporting period, the competent public prosecutor's office closed the investigation in one case in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; the Federal Police terminated preliminary investigations in three cases for lack of sufficient evidence. All other proceedings were still underway when the reporting period ended⁹.

In three cases, the employment contract was terminated.

- **Other cases:** One case involving four suspects (three public officials, one third party) occurred at the headquarters of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. The public officials were suspected of having accepted an invitation from a third party to a VIP sport event worth €540 per person and not having declared it for approval. As a result, a warning was issued against two of these public officials, one terminated the employment contract him-/herself. The criminal investigations into all four suspects were still underway during the reporting period.

⁹ This includes one case in which proceedings were dropped in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because they did not offer sufficient reason for preferring public charges.

In another case, an administrative investigation into an external employee found that the allegation that the employee illegally accepted benefits was not true.

ii) Proceedings involving persons not employed by Customs

The Federal Foreign Office reported four new cases of suspected corruption involving non-staff members to the Federal Police Headquarters. In two cases, investigations into unknown perpetrators were launched but later terminated for lack of evidence. In the other cases, there was an initial suspicion involving a third party and investigations were continued, in one case on account of possible smuggling activities and in the other case on account of obtaining a visa based on a fraudulent health certificate.

bb) Federal Ministry of Finance (without Customs)

i) Proceedings involving staff

The Federal Ministry of Finance reported two new cases of suspected corruption within its remit (without Customs) involving its own staff. Details:

- In one case, the Bunderepublik Deutschland – Finanzagentur GmbH received an anonymous tip-off that one of its traders had paid a higher brokerage to a broker than was allowed for concluding money market transactions. This was confirmed in the resulting investigation led by the compliance office and the internal audit of the Finanzagentur. The Finanzagentur then reported this to the police. As a consequence, the trader was relieved from his/her duties with immediate effect and his/her employment contract was terminated. The broker had to cancel the manipulated transactions and refund the brokerage received for it. The public prosecutor's office could not establish sufficient evidence justifying criminal prosecution on account of breach of trust, fraud or accepting and offering bribes in business transactions; therefore the investigation was terminated in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- The second incident occurred at the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA). In violation of procurement law provisions, two BImA employees awarded a contract for craft services without advertisement or competition. In return, they received a cash amount equivalent to 5-10% of the contract value. As a consequence, the BImA dismissed the two employees without notice. The employees concerned brought legal actions under labour law before the court. The BImA won the cases and the court's decisions were final. The criminal investigation into the employees concerned was still underway during the reporting period.

ii) Proceedings involving persons not employed by the Federal Ministry of Finance

The BI mA reported another case involving only a third party. After the completion of a real estate transaction with the BI mA, the buyer – after meeting with the BI mA official responsible for the transaction – left a gift in the meeting room (perfume and €1,000 cash). The official reported this immediately. The BI mA reported the incident to the police.

cc) Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs)

i) Proceedings involving staff

The Federal Ministry of Finance reported three new cases of suspected corruption involving nine staff members in the customs area. Details:

- One employee was suspected of having manipulated enforcement data in the IT system and of prioritising enforcement action for reasons not related to the case in order to gain a personal advantage. The suspicion was not confirmed, however. No financial damage was caused. The criminal investigation was terminated for lack of evidence (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, a warning was issued against the employee concerned.
- In one customs office, seven customs officials were suspected of having helped third parties operating on a commercial or gang basis to evade import duties by undervaluating goods from South-East Asia (textile primary products, textiles and commodities, among others). One customs official was also suspected of having incited a subordinate to commit an unlawful act in public office (Sections 397 (2) Fiscal Code and Section 357 Criminal Code). Disciplinary proceedings and criminal investigations of all customs officials involved were opened.
- One official, who was responsible for reviewing contracts for work and services with a certain private company, was suspected of having accepted an interest-free loan of €400,000 from this company. A criminal investigation into suspected corruption was launched.

ii) Proceedings involving persons not employed by Customs

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs), two criminal investigations were opened, each involving two persons not employed by Customs. Details:

- In one case, a third party tried to persuade control officers and one clearance officer, whom he knew from training, to exempt certain individuals from checks when departing from a free port. These individuals planned to smuggle cigarettes and car components. For letting them pass through, the customs officials were offered €3,000 to €4,000 cash in return. Both officials rejected the bribe and

informed their supervisor. The competent public prosecutor's office and the Customs Investigation Office launched investigations already in the reporting year.

- In another case, as part of an inspection of a business pursuant to Section 2 et seqq. of the Act to Combat Clandestine Employment, a questionnaire had to be answered. When the questionnaire was returned, a fifty-euro banknote was affixed to it near the signature panel. The incident was reported to the public prosecutor's office for suspicion of corruption (Section 333 Criminal Code).

dd) Federal Ministry of the Interior

The Federal Ministry of the Interior reported two new cases of suspected corruption within its remit.

- Investigations into two Federal Police officers and one third party were opened, two on suspicion of taking bribes and one on suspicion of bribery. A Chinese national who was in the transit area of an airport was said to have passed the entry control by mistake. In order to reach his onward flight, he passed through border control once again. There, he said, he had given the control officer cash but had not received a receipt. He then reported this incident to another officer. After an internal investigation, the Federal Police reported the incident to the competent public prosecutor's office. The subsequent investigation was later terminated for lack of evidence both with regard to the third part and one of the two Federal Police officers (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Investigations into the other of the two Federal Police officers continued and disciplinary proceedings were opened against them.
- Another investigation was opened into a staff member of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). He was suspected of having brought scrap to one of the premises of the BBK without announcing the delivery. It was suspected that he had planned to steal the scrap and that this had already happened before.

ee) Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety

The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety reported one new case of suspected corruption. One public official was suspected of having accepted a private loan and thus having gained an advantage within the meaning of Section 331 of the Criminal Code (taking bribes). The official was subject to a criminal investigation and disciplinary proceedings.

ff) Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure

The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure reported four new cases of suspected corruption within its remit. All investigations were closed in the reporting year.

- One Waterways and Shipping Agency reported that one of its branch offices had received €100 from a terminal operator in return for good cooperation. The cash was sent in an envelope not addressed to a particular person. The terminal operator called it “a contribution for the next barbecue”. The criminal investigation into the agency’s officials was terminated for lack of evidence (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The investigation of the company was terminated in accordance with Section 153 a of the Code of Criminal Procedure against payment of a fine.
- In two cases, the names of staff members of various agencies were on the guest lists for company anniversaries. One of the staff members did not accept the invitation. The other staff member attended the anniversary party after his superior had given his consent. In both cases, the criminal investigation was terminated for lack of evidence (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
- The Federal Aviation Office reported one case in which a staff member was suspected of demanding a benefit for a relative (Taking bribes - Section 332 of the Criminal Code; and Aiding and Taking bribes - Sections 332 and 27 of the Criminal Code). He wanted the relative to be awarded a contract as dog handler so that he could pass the dog handler exam. The investigation into the case did not confirm the suspicion and the proceedings were therefore terminated in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

gg) Federal Ministry of Defence

The Federal Ministry of Defence reported two new criminal proceedings in the reporting year.

- One case was reported by the legal adviser of the German Army Headquarters: A former soldier was suspected of having accepted gifts from contractors of the Bundeswehr. A criminal investigation on suspicion of taking bribes (Section 331 of the Criminal Code) was initiated.
- Another case was reported by a state criminal police office through the Internet-based anonymous whistle-blower platform “BKMS”. The whistle blower warned of possible irregularities regarding the procurement of bakery products by the Bundeswehr Subsistence Office. A review of the procurement file did not find any indications for a violation of applicable legal provisions by the official of the Bundeswehr Subsistence Office. The competent public prosecutor's office

therefore terminated the investigation in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

hh) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development received an anonymous tipp-off by mail warning of alleged irregularities regarding the award of contracts by one particular division. An internal investigation found that the accusation was unfounded. The investigation was terminated in the reporting year.

c) Overview of proceedings concluded in 2016

During the 2016 reporting year and until the start of 2017, a total of 35 proceedings involving suspected corruption, mostly from the previous years, were concluded. This included 22 criminal proceedings (two of which involved third parties, the remaining ones also involved federal public officials) and seven proceedings under labour law.

Ten of the criminal proceedings ended with a criminal conviction or a penal order (four convictions/penal orders against federal public officials and six against third parties).

Of the disciplinary proceedings one ended with the dismissal of a public official from service, the other one with a demotion of a public official. Six labour law proceedings ended with a dismissal or contractual termination of the employment relationship.

In all other cases, proceedings were terminated. However, in two cases criminal proceedings were terminated (termination pursuant to Section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure against payment of a fine) while disciplinary proceedings were continued.

In 43 % of these concluded disciplinary proceedings and proceedings under labour law, sufficient evidence of guilt was found to impose punishment or disciplinary measures against federal public officials.

aa) Federal Foreign Office

During the reporting year, three proceedings from previous years were concluded within the remit of the Federal Foreign Office. The incidents occurred at visa offices abroad. In two visa offices, there was an initial suspicion involving a local employee. Both suspects were dismissed. In another case, no evidence was found to substantiate the suspicion.¹⁰

¹⁰ One case was terminated by the public prosecutor's office in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2015. This was notified to the Federal Foreign Office not before 2016, so that this case was reported later.

bb) The Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media (BKM)

In the previous reporting year, the Federal Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), an agency within the remit of the BKM, reported a case of suspected corruption which has now been completed. A criminal investigation into two BStU officials was initiated on suspicion of breach of trust in the award of contracts. The investigation was terminated in accordance with Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

cc) Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, seven proceedings from previous years were concluded. All cases involved staff members from the Federal Employment Agency.

- One public official from the Federal Employment Agency responsible for job placement services was found guilty of disclosure of social data to an unauthorized third party and, by penal order, ordered to pay a fine of €2,700 (Section 85 (2) nos. 1 and 3 and Section 85 a (1) of the Social Code (SGB X) in conjunction with Section 53 of the Criminal Code). His employment relationship was terminated with a contract of annulment. The criminal investigation into the third party (recipient of the social data) is still going on.
- A public official of a joint public-private institution was suspected of having accepted advantages, for example construction and maintenance services carried out on his private property as part of a measure [to provide work for long-term unemployed persons]. One employee of the company which hired the participants in the measure who performed the work was convicted on a charge of giving bribes (Section 333 of the Criminal Code) and was ordered to pay a fine of €1,800. The public official was acquitted.
- A public official of a joint public-private institution had demanded material and financial benefits from an applicant in return for the fact that he would further extend the period approved for grants. He was convicted on charges of taking bribes (Sections 332 (1), 333, 335 and 338 of the Criminal Code) in 24 cases and sentenced to one year and seven months in prison; the court found that this was an especially serious offence and therefore ordered an extended forfeiture of replacement value of €4,500. The enforcement of the custodial sentence was suspended. In proceedings concerning the termination based on the Act on the Protection of Dismissal, the initial termination without notice was changed to a termination upon notice. The third party giving bribes was ordered to pay a fine.
- One staff member of a joint public-private institution directed unlawful payments into his own bank account and into the bank accounts of third parties.

For these unlawful payments (provision of benefits pursuant to Social Code II) he demanded, and received, from the third parties between 40% and 80% of the amounts paid. A total amount of more than €150,000 was embezzled. The staff member was convicted on charges of breach of trust in 99 cases, including 89 cases coinciding with taking bribes (Sections 332, 335, 263 and 266 of the Criminal code) and sentenced to one year and ten months in prison. The court regarded the offence as especially serious. The enforcement of the custodial sentence was suspended. The suspicion was raised for the first time in 2011. At that time, the employment relationship of the staff member was terminated on grounds of a suspected crime. The third party involved was sentenced to one year in prison on charges of aiding and abetting breach of trust in 49 cases coinciding with giving bribes (Sections 332, 335, 263 and 266 of the Criminal Code). The other third party was sentenced to one year and two months on the same charges (Sections 332, 335, 263 and 266 of the Criminal Code) in 40 cases. In both cases, the enforcement of the custodial sentence was suspended.

- A staff member of a joint public-private institution who was responsible for job placement of the under-25s demanded sexual acts from a female client and threatened her. He was sentenced to ten months in prison on charges of coercion and threatening behaviour (Sections 240 (1) and (4) nos. 1 and 3 and Section 241 of the Criminal Code). The enforcement of the custodial sentence was suspended. Before the disciplinary matter was heard, the staff member (a civil servant) had asked to be released from civil service, to which his employer agreed.
- A criminal investigation into two other staff members of the Federal Employment Agency and into joint public-private institutions was terminated pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In both cases, the suspicion (unlawful granting of unemployment benefits and start-up grants and unlawful approval of training measures) proved to be unfounded.

dd) Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs)

i) Proceedings involving staff

Within the customs administration of the Federal Ministry of Finance, six proceedings were concluded during the reporting year.

- One employee was suspected of having cleared under-invoiced textiles and shoes from South-East Asia (see previous report). This suspicion could not be substantiated. In the reporting year 2016, the disciplinary proceedings against the civil servant concerned were terminated without establishing a misconduct.

- In a similar case (tolerating the undervaluation of imported textiles and shoes from South-East Asia and disclosure of information relevant for clearing the goods by a senior official) the criminal investigation was terminated because of impediments (permanent unfitness of the suspect to stand trial) (Section 206a of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The related disciplinary proceedings were also terminated.
- In another case, a customs official had accepted the declarations for export from a company and released the goods without prior examination at the customs office; on many occasions, he even was not responsible for the local customs procedures. In return he received an MP3 player, a used PC and regular lunch meals, among other things. On 6 July 2009, the competent local court imposed an aggregate expropriation order and ordered the customs official to pay a fine of a total of 120 daily rates at €35 each (Sections 331 (1) and 53 of the Criminal Code) on charges of wilful taking of bribes in two cases of multiple offences committed by multiple acts (Sections 331 (1) and 53 of the Criminal Code). In the disciplinary proceedings, the competent administrative court downgraded the official concerned by two pay steps.
- The sport instructor of a main customs office was subject to criminal investigation for alleged taking of bribes (Section 332 of the Criminal Code) and breach of official secrets and special duties of confidentiality (Section 353b of the Criminal Code). The civil servant disclosed personal data of 203 prospective civil servants to an insurance company; these data had been provided to him to prepare and conduct sport tests as part of the recruitment procedure. In return, the insurance company gave him football strips for the main customs office's football team. The criminal proceedings were terminated against payment of €500 in accordance with Section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The disciplinary proceedings were also terminated in the reporting year pursuant to Section 32 (1) no. 3 of the Federal Disciplinary Act. In accordance with Section 14 (1) no. 1 of the Federal Disciplinary Act (Prohibition to take measures on the same grounds as in criminal proceedings), it was not permitted to impose the necessary disciplinary measure against the civil servant, who had retired in the meantime.
- Criminal investigation into two customs officials initiated in the previous year were terminated against payment of €500 each (Section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The court could not substantiate the suspicion that the customs officials had offered to take free concert tickets meant as an incentive to violate their official duties. The decision to terminate the criminal proceedings was based on the minor value of the benefit and the minor nature of the guilt. The

disciplinary proceedings initiated at the same time were still pending when the reporting period ended.

ii) Proceedings involving persons not employed by Customs

Within the customs administration, two proceedings involving persons not employed by Customs were also concluded.

- In the course of an inspection of a business pursuant to Section 2 et seqq. of the Act to Combat Clandestine Employment, the business owner's husband had asked the inspecting customs officers to tell him the name of the whistle-blower and offered them €500. The husband was found guilty of giving bribes as an incentive to the recipient's violating his official duties (Section 334 (1) of the Criminal Code) and ordered to pay a fine of 120 daily rates at €11 each.
- In another case, customs officials inspecting a market stall in Germany found 600 cigarettes with a Polish revenue stamp, 4.4 litres of Vodka with a Polish stamp and 93 litres of Polish beer. The Polish market vendor offered one carton of cigarettes to each customs official to make them finish the inspection and drop criminal charges. The market vendor was found guilty of bribery of a minor nature (Section 334 (1) of the Criminal Code) and ordered to pay a fine of 20 daily rates at € 5 each.

ee) Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, proceedings from previous years were concluded in one case. When inspecting a vehicle, an official of the Federal Office for Goods Transport apparently identified a defect and promised not to report it if the lorry driver made a major purchase in his wife's shop. The resulting investigation carried out by the public prosecutor's office was terminated for lack of sufficient evidence pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ff) Federal Ministry of Defence

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, two proceedings were concluded during the reporting year.

- A staff member of a Bundeswehr service centre received material and financial benefits (iPad, notebook, money) from a contractor who in turn used existing contracts to charge the service centre of the Bundeswehr for these benefits. The criminal investigation opened on suspicion of taking bribes and offering bribes in business transactions was terminated pursuant to Section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The suspect had to pay out the sums of money totalling some €1,200 to the Bundeswehr service centre, transfer the objects to the Federal Ministry of Defence and pay €3,000 to the state purse. The proceedings under

labour law that had been opened at the same time resulted in the annulment of the employment contract already in 2015.

- A criminal investigation into a military staff member on suspicion of taking of bribes (gifts from a car dealer) was terminated due to lack of evidence (Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

V. Implementation status of the Directive

1. Areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

Measures to prevent corruption in the federal administration start with identifying areas of activity which are especially vulnerable to corruption.

No. 2 of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration:

Identifying and analysing areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

In all federal agencies, measures to identify areas of activity which are especially vulnerable to corruption shall be carried out at regular intervals and as warranted by circumstances. The use of risk analyses shall be considered for this purpose. The results of the risk analysis shall be used to determine any changes in organization, procedures or personnel assignments.

The recommendations intended to help interpret and explain the Federal Government Anti-Corruption Directive describe the term “areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption” in further detail.

Recommendation on No. 2 of the Directive

Identifying and analysing areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

1. Procedure for identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

1.1 To identify areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption within an agency, all areas of activity will be examined for their vulnerability to corruption. Before the process of identification begins, all available information about the various positions and activities (e.g. organizational charts, task assignment charts) should be analysed in order to have as complete an overview as possible of the area to be investigated. A questionnaire may be used to collect additional information needed. Questions about the characteristics listed below (see No. 2 below) may focus on positions or tasks in order to identify areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. After compiling all available data, the investigating organizational unit will make a final determination as to special vulnerability to corruption. The results should be compiled and documented for the entire agency (for example in a risk atlas).

The handbook on identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption offers extensive assistance with conducting this procedure.

1.2 The identification process can be divided into two steps: The first step involves identifying the areas of activity in which staff influence on decision-making leads to advantages of significant value to others (areas of activity vulnerable to corruption). Based on these results, areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption can be identified in a second step.

2. Areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

2.1 The following areas of activity are usually especially vulnerable to corruption:

- a. areas in which staff influence on decision-making may lead to advantages of significant value to others, and
- b. activities involving at least one of the following:
 - frequent outside contacts, especially monitoring and supervisory activities,
 - management of large budgets, award of public contracts, subsidies, grants or other funds,
 - imposing of conditions, granting of concessions, approvals, permits and the like, setting and levying of fees,
 - processing of transactions and operations using internal information not intended for third parties.
 - This list is not exhaustive. In certain cases, activities may be especially vulnerable to corruption even in the absence of these characteristics.

2. Areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

2.2 *The criteria listed above are explained in the handbook on identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption.*

3. Risk analysis

3.1 *In areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption,*

- *after identifying special vulnerability to corruption for the first time,*
- *after organizational or procedural changes,*
- *after changes to assigned tasks, or*
- *after no more than five years,*
- *the need for conducting a risk analysis should be examined. To do so, the existing safeguards for each area of activity especially vulnerable to corruption and the effectiveness of these safeguards should be briefly examined.*

3.2 *If the brief examination points to a need for action, a risk analysis is to be conducted. For this purpose, the individual operations and processes and existing safeguards against corruption will be examined for each area of activity. This will be followed by an evaluation as to whether the existing safeguards are sufficiently effective to counter the risks. If action is needed, then the organization and processes and/or personnel assignments are to be examined to see how they can be changed. In this case, the risk analysis will include recommendations and/or order additional measures. The key aspects of a risk analysis are described in Annex 5 of the handbook on identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption.*

The standardized procedures for identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption have stood the test since their introduction in 2007. Usually, workflows are used to ask staff members to fill in a questionnaire for a self-assessment of their area of activity. These questionnaires are usually reviewed by superiors. Interviews with the heads of divisions conducted by the Internal Audit division or the contact person for corruption prevention are another method. Both methods aim at facilitating the identification of activities especially vulnerable to corruption and also making it easier for staff and supervisors to classify an area of activity by answering specific questions. It is important for employees to understand that the intent is to identify objectively areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption, not to evaluate employees' personal suitability. The Anti-Corruption Directive allows for a two-step procedure which it describes in greater detail; it also allows for the procedure to be carried out in one step, which in some cases requires less organizational effort. Describing the results of the first and second steps would result in values that are not comparable to each other, because different authorities take different approaches. For this reason, the practice of including these results in the annual report that was followed up to 2012 was not followed in the present report.

a) Identifying areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

The status of the identification of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption is reported on below: for the supreme federal authorities in aa) and for their executive agencies in bb). In Annex 2, Table a (supreme federal authorities) and in Annex 3, Table a (executive agencies) also provide an overview.

Updating has continued to be the preferred instrument for gathering data. Electronic personnel management systems have made it possible to keep updated records on which staff perform certain tasks and thus work in areas especially vulnerable to corruption, without the need for time-consuming full reviews and also in case of changes in staffing or organization. This also makes it easier to conduct statistical analyses.

aa) Supreme federal authorities

All areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption were identified and recorded in all the supreme federal authorities except the Federal Ministry of Defence (further information follows) at least once. During the reporting year, 11,881 employees in the supreme federal authorities worked in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption.

The most recent full review in the Federal Ministry of Defence was conducted in 2005. An updated full review of all areas of activity was postponed by the reorganization of the Bundeswehr and the restructuring of the ministry effective 1 April 2012; this review is still under way. Also in 2016, further areas were analysed (by now, between fifty and sixty per cent of all areas of activity have been reviewed). The reviews completed in the reporting year found that 328 areas of activity are especially vulnerable to corruption.¹¹

Of the 23 supreme federal authorities 20 conducted a full review or full update in 2012 or later (i.e., no more than four years prior to the 2016 reporting period). Current data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption based on complete reviews or updates in 2016 are available for 16 supreme federal authorities.

bb) Executive agencies

In the executive agencies of all federal ministries, the amount of data is described below. This description does not include the Federal Employment Agency, the pension insurance scheme for miners, railway and maritime workers (DRV Knappschaft-Bahn-See) or the social insurance scheme for agriculture, forestry and horticulture workers (all within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), because special conditions apply to the way they collect data.¹²

¹¹ The Federal Ministry of Defence plans to complete the review of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in 2017.

¹² With more than 100,000 staff, the Federal Employment Agency does not classify individual positions with regard to their vulnerability to corruption. It does so for the individual areas of activity, which are recorded in a risk atlas. Supervisors are trained to serve as multipliers at their workplaces. No separate statistics are recorded on the staff trained there. The pension insurance scheme for miners, railway and maritime workers and the social insurance scheme for agriculture, forestry and horticulture workers do not classify individual positions either; they classify areas of activity. For this reason, all three agencies are not included in the description here.

i) Executive agencies (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence)

Reliable data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption are available for 215 executive agencies of the federal ministries with a total of 199,155 staff, out of a total of 227 executive agencies with a total of 206,917 staff¹³ (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence). No reliable data are available for 12 executive agencies with a total of 7,762 staff. This means that, on the cut-off date for this report, reliable data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption were available for 96.2 % of the staff positions in the executive agencies of all federal ministries (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Employment Agency, the pension insurance scheme for miners, railway and maritime workers or the social insurance scheme for agriculture, forestry and horticulture workers). So, almost all staff positions in the executive agencies have been reviewed.

Based on these data, during the reporting year, 43,096 staff in the executive agencies of the federal ministries worked in areas especially vulnerable to corruption.

By the data collection cut-off date, existing data on 29,907 staff (15.0 %) in the executive agencies of the federal ministries other than the Federal Ministry of Defence were based on full reviews; on 138,713 staff (69.7 %) on updates; on 3,844 staff (1.9%) on partial reviews and on 26,691 staff (13.4 %) partly on full reviews and partly on updates within the same authority.

Current data on especially vulnerable areas of activity based on complete reviews or updates in 2016 were available for 193 executive agencies. Only in 11 executive agencies was the latest full review or update of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption conducted in 2011 or earlier (i.e., more than five years prior to the 2016 reporting period).

ii) Remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, with a total of 677 workplaces and 213,805 staff, the existing data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in 63 workplaces are based on updates, in 139 workplaces on full reviews, in 28 workplaces on partial reviews, and in 41 workplaces partly on full reviews and partly on updates within the same authority.

¹³ Not including the Federal Employment Agency, the pension insurance scheme for miners, railway and maritime workers or the social insurance scheme for agriculture, forestry and horticulture workers.

There are no current reliable figures on especially vulnerable areas of activity for three (out of 19) workplaces in the higher-level administration, for 22 (out of 116) workplaces in the mid-level administration, or for 303 (out of 536) workplaces in the lower-level administration, or for one of four companies in which the Federation is a shareholder.

Current data on especially vulnerable areas of activity based on complete reviews or updates in 2016 were available for 278 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence. In 30 workplaces, the latest full review or update of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption was conducted in 2011 or earlier (i.e., more than five years prior to the 2016 reporting period).

Based on these data, during the reporting year, 5,257 staff in the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence worked in areas especially vulnerable to corruption.

b) Risk analysis

Nineteen supreme federal authorities identified a need for a risk analysis regarding areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption, and risk analyses were conducted in 16 supreme federal authorities.

In 12 of the 14 remits of the federal ministries (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence), the need for risk analysis for a total of 24,632 jobs especially vulnerable to corruption was reviewed. In these 12 remits, a total of 20,586 areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption, that is 83.57 %, were reviewed. Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the need for risk analysis was reviewed for 3,358 especially vulnerable jobs; risk analyses were conducted for 3,029 especially vulnerable jobs, or 90.2 %.

Organizational and other measures were taken not only based on the results of the risk analyses, but also for other reasons, for example to compensate for the inability to rotate staff, due to organizational concerns or as a human resources development measure pre-dating the risk analysis. So it is not possible to determine the number of cases in which risk analysis was responsible for introducing such measures. This report, like those for previous years, therefore does not include information on this point.

2. Applying the rotation rule for areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

No. 4 of the Directive: Staff

4.1 Staff members for areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption shall be selected with particular care.

4.2 The length of staff assignments in areas especially vulnerable to corruption shall in principle be limited; as a rule, it should not exceed a period of five years. If an assignment must be extended beyond this period, the reasons shall be recorded for the file.

Rotating staff and tasks can help prevent corrupt relationships from forming. If rotation is not possible at all or not within the recommended time, the reasons should be recorded and other recommended measures to prevent corruption should be taken.

The long-standing practice of not applying the principle of job rotation in most cases has not changed, because the relevant staff are specialists who cannot be rotated or because they have other specialized skills which are difficult to replace. The further growing complexity of tasks is aggravating the situation. This also holds true for the situation on the labour market. Not least because of the demographic changes, there is a considerable shortage of skilled labour in certain areas, such as IT or engineering. The federal administration is not among the most attractive employers. The cut backs on personnel resources throughout all sectors in recent years have additionally worsened the situation.

Other reasons for not rotating staff are impending separation from active service, impending change of job or the lack of an equivalent position elsewhere. At the same time, there are not enough data on which to base reliable conclusions that not applying the rotation principle is the reason for suspicious cases (the number of which has remained small). This may be true in certain cases, but other factors also play a role.

For the first time, for the present report information on whether and if so, how long suspects were involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption were collected in addition to the usual information on cases of suspected corruption (see IV.). The result of this data collection was as follows:

- **New cases of suspected corruption.** A total of 40 cases of suspected corruption¹⁴ were reported, of which 31 involved a total of 51 public officials.
 - **Termination of investigations in the reporting year.** In 15 cases, the investigation into public officials was terminated because they were unfounded or because of lack of evidence (termination either pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the Federal Police). In one case, the employment contract of the public official concerned was

¹⁴ The analysis below does not take into account the following four cases. In two cases, where no information on the persons concerned was given, investigations were terminated pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the suspicion could not be substantiated in the examination conducted. Seven cases of suspected corruption involved only third parties (parties giving bribes).

terminated after the investigation. One internal investigation found that the suspicion was unfounded and it was therefore terminated. Of the public officials concerned, nine were involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption. Four of these public officials¹⁵ had performed these tasks for more than five years.

- **Further investigations.** Investigations into 34 public officials, including two unknown public officials, were still going on when the reporting year ended. Of the public officials concerned, 23 were involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption. Of these, eleven stayed in the same job longer than the recommended five-year length of staff assignment in areas especially vulnerable to corruption pursuant to the Anti-Corruption Directive (see no 4.2).
- **Cases of suspected corruption from previous years.** In the reporting year, 22 cases of suspected corruption from previous years were completed. Of these¹⁶, 18 involved a total of 18 public officials.

In six cases, either the suspects were acquitted or the investigation was terminated pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Of the public officials concerned, four were involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption. Of the remaining 12 public officials, six were involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption. In one case, the public official concerned stayed in the same job longer than the recommended five-year length of staff assignment in areas especially vulnerable to corruption pursuant to the Anti-Corruption Directive (see no. 4.2).

The question of how internal administrative provisions need to be changed to provide more effective and practicable instruments for job rotation and personnel development measures is currently being discussed between all federal ministries. It is being examined whether universities with a particular focus on anti-corruption should be involved in dealing with the issue of job rotation, for example the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, the Hertie School of Governance Berlin, the Viadrina Compliance Center, the Federal University of Public Administration or the University Potsdam. Possible forms of cooperation include the granting of bachelor's or master's

¹⁵ In one case, the investigation into an unknown individual found that the allegations were unfounded and the investigation was therefore terminated. Hence, no information on the length of assignment in an area especially vulnerable to corruption can be given.

¹⁶ The analysis below does not take into account the following four cases: In two cases, where no information on the persons concerned was given, investigations were terminated pursuant to Section 170 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the suspicion could not be substantiated in the examination conducted. Two cases of suspected corruption involved only third parties (parties giving bribes).

theses awards or student competitions. As already mentioned in the 2015 report, the possibilities offered by digital technologies should also be considered. The Anti-Corruption Directive is currently being revised.

a) Supreme federal authorities

The length of assignment to jobs especially vulnerable to corruption provides information on staff rotation. In the supreme federal authorities (including the Federal Ministry of Defence), the share of staff assigned to areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption for more than five years was 27.6 % on average. The share of staff assigned to areas especially vulnerable to corruption for more than five years was

- more than 60 % in one supreme federal authority,
- between 40% and 60% in five supreme federal authorities, and
- less than 40 % in nine supreme federal authorities.

As indicated above, after conducting a thorough risk analysis of the relevant areas, the Federal Constitutional Court identified no areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. No information is available for the remaining supreme federal authorities, or the reference date is less than five years in the past due to a recent risk analysis.

The supreme federal authorities (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence) explained their failure to rotate staff after five years as follows:

Reasons for failure to rotate - executive agencies (not including Federal Ministry of Defence)



b) Executive agencies (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence)


Some executive agencies (not including the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence) have not yet fully identified how long staff serve in areas especially vulnerable to corruption. Information is available for 170 executive agencies (not including the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence) and a total of 137,513 staff. The share of staff in these executive agencies assigned to areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption for more than five years was on average

- 24.5 % in the superior federal authorities,
- 41.4 % in the lower federal authorities,
- 35.7 % in the federal courts,
- 43.4 % in the legal persons governed by private law and
- 37.7 % in the remaining authorities not belonging to any of these categories.

For 6,740 of these staff members working for more than five years in an area especially vulnerable to corruption, corruption-prevention measures were taken to compensate for the risks related to a lack of rotation.

No staff of the Federal Police (remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior) or the Federal Office of Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions (remit of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth) working in areas especially vulnerable to corruption were assigned to these positions for more than five years.

The reasons given for the failure to rotate in the executive agencies were as follows (number reported; reports from groups of agencies were only counted once):



c) Executive agencies of the Federal Ministry of Defence

For technical reasons, the Federal Ministry of Defence remit is not included in the statistics given above. The situation there is as follows:

Information on the length of staff assignments in areas especially vulnerable to corruption is available for 19 workplaces in the higher-level administration, 116 workplaces in the Intermediate administration and 536 workplaces in the lower-level administration, the two Bundeswehr disciplinary and complaints courts and for four legal persons governed by private law. Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, 745 of the total 5,257 staff working in areas especially vulnerable to corruption were entrusted with the same or similar tasks especially vulnerable to corruption for more than five years. Of these, 30 worked in the higher-level administration, 1,110 in the mid-level administration and 604 in the lower-level administration; one worked for legal

persons governed by private law. For 453 (61 %) of these staff members, corruption-prevention measures were taken to compensate for the risks related to a lack of rotation.

3. Administrative and operational supervision

Rigorous administrative and operational supervision is a key instrument for preventing corruption.

No. 9 of the Directive: Conscientious administrative and operational supervision

9.1 Supervisors shall perform their duties of administrative and operational supervision in a conscientious manner. This includes taking anticipatory measures for personnel management and evaluation.

Supervisors shall pay attention to any signs of corruption. They shall alert their staff to the risk of corruption regularly and as circumstances require.

Administrative and operational supervision in the context of corruption prevention is understood in two ways:

- with regard to supervisors and their staff, as an instrument for taking anticipatory measures for personnel management and evaluation, and
- with regard to federal ministries and the executive agencies within their remit, as a key element for managing and monitoring the federal administration.

Fourteen supreme federal authorities (including the Federal Ministry of Defence) and 173 executive agencies, as well as 547 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence have specific regulations on monitoring staff as to how they perform their duties (administrative supervision). Fourteen supreme federal authorities, 172 executive agencies and 227 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence have specific regulations on monitoring lawfulness and expedience (operational supervision). Sixteen supreme federal authorities, 175 executive agencies and 89 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence have additional regulations concerning areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption; these regulations include for example special tests, special conditions for awarding contracts and the publication of risk atlases.

The 12 supreme federal authorities (including the Federal Ministry of Defence) which are responsible for administrative and operational supervision of the executive agencies within their remit have the following regulations on cooperation (multiple answers were possible):

- ten supreme federal authorities issue instructions or orders to deal with cases of suspected corruption;

- ten supreme federal authorities have introduced a requirement to report cases of suspected corruption;
- nine supreme federal authorities require regular reports on the implementation of the Directive; and
- ten supreme federal authorities take other measures.

These instruments are also widespread among the few executive agencies outside the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence which exercise administrative or operational supervision of other authorities. It is not possible to provide exact figures here because groups of agencies reported cumulatively.

Details on the supreme federal authorities can be found in Annex 2, Table d and on the individual remits in Annex 3, Table e.

4. Principle of greater scrutiny and transparency

According to the Anti-Corruption Directive, to reduce the risk of errors and misuse, important decisions are not to be made by individual staff members on their own.

No. 3 of the Directive: Principle of greater scrutiny and transparency

3.1 The principle of greater scrutiny (ensuring that a number of staff members or organizational units take part in or are responsible for checking operations) shall be observed particularly in areas of activity which are especially vulnerable to corruption. If this is not possible due to legal provisions or insurmountable practical difficulties, then random checks or other measures for preventing corruption (e.g. more intensive administrative and operational supervision) may be used instead.

3.2 Transparency of decisions and the decision-making process shall be guaranteed (e.g. via the clear delegation of responsibility, mechanisms for reporting, IT-supported oversight of operations, precise and complete documentation of proceedings).

The principle of greater scrutiny may be implemented in two ways:

- through regulations requiring a second staff member to check work results, meaning that different people are responsible for working on the same task;
- (co-)review and monitoring of work results by additional staff (plausibility check).

Twentyone supreme federal authorities (including the Federal Ministry of Defence) and 209 executive agencies as well as 400 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence require a second staff member to check work results.

All 23 supreme federal authorities and 218 executive agencies as well as 428 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence conduct plausibility checks.

To fulfil the principle of greater scrutiny, IT-assisted workflows are used in 21 supreme federal authorities (including the Federal Ministry of Defence) and 206 executive agencies as well as 456 workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

Additional details, especially regarding the kinds of processes supported by IT-assisted workflows, can be found in Annex 2, Table e (supreme federal authorities) and Annex 3, Table f (executive agencies).

5. Contact person for corruption prevention

No. 5 of the Directive: Contact person for corruption prevention

5.1 A contact person for corruption prevention shall be appointed based on the tasks and size of the agency. One contact person may be responsible for more than one agency. Contact persons may be charged with the following tasks:

- a) serving as a contact person for agency staff and management, if necessary without having to go through official channels, along with private persons;
- b) advising agency management;
- c) keeping staff members informed (e.g. by means of regularly scheduled seminars and presentations);
- d) assisting with training;
- e) monitoring and assessing any indications of corruption;
- f) helping keep the public informed about penalties under public service law and criminal law (preventive effect) while respecting the privacy rights of those concerned.

5.2 If the contact person becomes aware of facts leading to reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed, he or she shall inform the agency management and make recommendations on conducting an internal investigation, on taking measures to prevent concealment and on informing the law enforcement authorities. The agency management shall take the necessary steps to deal with the matter.

5.3 Contact persons shall not be delegated any authority to carry out disciplinary measures; they shall not lead investigations in disciplinary proceedings for corruption cases.

5.4 Agencies shall provide contact persons promptly and comprehensively with the information needed to perform their duties, particularly with regard to incidents of suspected corruption.

5.5 In carrying out their duties of corruption prevention, contact persons shall be independent of instructions. They shall have the right to report directly to the head of the agency and may not be subject to discrimination as a result of performing their duties.

5.6 Even after completing their term of office, contact persons shall not disclose any information they have gained about staff members' personal circumstances; they may however provide such information to agency management or personnel management if they have a reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed. Personal data shall be treated in accordance with the principles of personnel records management.

All the supreme federal authorities have contact persons for corruption prevention. The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information assumed the status of a supreme federal authority effective 1 January 2016 and also appointed a contact person for corruption prevention during the reporting year.


The executive agencies carrying out operational activities during the reporting period and other bodies within the remit of the federal ministries other than the Federal Ministry of Defence have contact persons for corruption prevention. The Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung mbH (the federal company for radioactive waste disposal) was set up in 2016 within the remit of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety and is still in the start-up phase. In April 2017, a contact person for corruption prevention was appointed. Fifty-nine executive agencies or bodies share a contact person with another agency. They are

- the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (15 staff),
- the Federal Institute for Population Research (46 staff),

- the Federal Institute of Sport Science (34 staff),
- the Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons (19 staff),
- the Federal Agency for Administrative Services (223 staff),
- Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (30 staff),
- the seven field offices of the Bundesrechnungshof (German SAI) (46 staff as administrative personnel), and
- 46 local offices for waterways and shipping and offices for new construction (11,207 staff).

Also in the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the overwhelming majority of workplaces has a contact person for corruption prevention. Twenty-five workplaces (of 677 reporting) within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence have not yet appointed a contact person for corruption prevention. Three hundred fifty-nine workplaces (255 of them in the lower-level administration and 103 in the intermediate administration) share a contact person with another agency.

The type and frequency of information provided by contact persons in the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit is shown in the following graphic (number of workplaces reporting; multiple answers possible):



In the reporting year, 522 contact persons for corruption prevention (including 346 from the defence ministry) met with agency management representatives to discuss issues related to corruption prevention. Thus the number of contact persons who met with agency management to discuss corruption prevention fell slightly compared to the previous year (557 contact persons who met with agency management). Annex 2, Table f (supreme federal authorities) and Annex 3, Table g (executive agencies) show the reasons for contacts and their frequency.

In the entire federal administration (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit), 185 full-time equivalents (as far as it was possible to collect specific figures) were assigned corruption prevention tasks. Performing the tasks of contact person for corruption prevention accounted for approximately 98.49 full-time equivalents, carried out by 464 persons. Other corruption prevention tasks were performed by 614 persons, accounting for 89.03 full-time equivalents.

Within the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit, an additional 500 persons (127.87 full-time equivalents) were responsible for the tasks of contact person for corruption prevention, while 241 persons (41.37 full-time equivalents) were assigned other corruption prevention tasks.

As a result, within the federal administration, corruption prevention was the task of 356.73 full-time equivalents.

6. Staff awareness

No. 7 of the Directive: Staff awareness and education

7.1 When taking the oath of office or agreeing to abide by the requirements of their position, staff members shall be informed of the risk of corruption and the consequences of corrupt behaviour. When a staff member has been informed, a record shall be kept of this fact. In view of the risk of corruption, staff attention shall continue to be directed to this issue. In addition, all staff members should be given an anti-corruption code of conduct, informing them of what to watch out for in situations or areas of activity which are especially vulnerable to corruption.



7.2 Staff members working in or transferred to areas especially vulnerable to corruption should be given additional, job-specific instruction at regular intervals.

In the entire federal administration (not including the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence), a total of 103,762 staff (out of a total of 364,296, i.e. 28.5%), including 8,523 supervisory staff, received corruption-awareness training. About 33.3 % of these staff worked in positions especially vulnerable to corruption. This does not mean that no such measures were provided for the remaining staff; some authorities reported comprehensive awareness-raising campaigns or special seminars in the past year. Further, during the reporting year 388 supervisory staff members were involved in providing awareness-raising measures as trainers, instructors or advisers.

Within the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit, 130,568 staff (out of a total of 216,598, or 60.3 %), including 7,473 supervisory staff, received corruption-awareness training. One hundred sixty-nine supervisory staff members were involved in providing awareness-raising measures as trainers, instructors or advisers.


As the following overviews show, in 47 % of all federal agencies, and in 86.75 % of workplaces within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, staff working in areas especially vulnerable to corruption receive corruption-awareness training every year:

Total federal administration (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit)




Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit

Corruption-awareness training for staff working in areas especially vulnerable to corruption (if applicable) -
 No. of workplaces reporting (Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit)



Corruption-awareness training for all other staff (if applicable) -
 No. of workplaces reporting (Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit)



7. *Basic and advanced training*

No. 8 of the Directive: Basic and advanced training

8. *Facilities providing basic and advanced training shall include corruption prevention in their programmes. In doing so, they shall take into account above all the training needs of supervisory staff, contact persons for corruption prevention, staff in areas especially vulnerable to corruption, and staff in the organizational units referred to in No. 6.*

Basic and advanced training extends beyond measures to increase awareness. This section describes measures having an interactive process in which a multiplier (instructor) imparts knowledge based on a concept using a certain system (didactics); as a rule, this knowledge is imparted in a multi-step process and then consolidated. A lecture, for example in the context of orientation for new staff, thus constitutes instruction for initial awareness rather than training. “E-learning” constitutes training if the interactive element in the imparting of knowledge plays a clearly recognizable role, for example when testing what has been learned.

In addition to an electronic learning programme (which is currently being upgraded and modernized), the Federal Academy of Public Administration (BAkÖV), the central federal training facility, always offers courses on preventing and fighting corruption and on preventing corruption in at-risk areas. These courses are intended especially for supervisory staff in the higher and higher intermediate service, for contact persons for corruption prevention, staff of organizational units responsible for preventing corruption and for staff in areas especially vulnerable to corruption. The courses deal with the forms corruption can take; recognizing behaviour that can corrupt; the tasks of the contact person for corruption prevention: fighting corruption (including relevant law and regulations); the national and international dimensions of corruption; the consequences pursuant to criminal, public service and labour law for those engaged in corrupt behaviour; how to speak and act in cases of suspected corruption. The special office for basic and advanced training of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure and the Federal Revenue Administration's Training and Knowledge Centre offer largely identical training seminars; the Bundeswehr's training centre offers orientation courses for contact persons for corruption prevention. In addition, the Federal Revenue Administration plans to introduce an obligatory e-learning module for advanced training for custom's administration senior staff. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure introduced its own electronic learning programme with three modules for different target groups for the ministry and its remit. In the 2016 reporting period, 2,257 staff members passed these modules. Since 2013, 16,724 staff have completed training in this way.

Overall, 13,612 staff took part in basic and advanced corruption-prevention training by the supreme federal authorities and their remit (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit); at least 4,976 of them were staff in areas especially vulnerable to corruption (not all authorities make this distinction for all course participants). In part, this can be explained by the fact that some organizational units have introduced further training obligations requiring also staff members who are not involved in activities particularly vulnerable to corruption to attend corruption-prevention training. Within the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit, 2,439 staff participated in basic and advanced training on preventing corruption; 170 of them were identified as working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption.

Executive staff of the ministries and workplaces in 69.44 % of the authorities reporting (other than the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit) received corruption-prevention training. In 2016, 2,505 supervisory staff were trained in preventing corruption, and 61 supervisory staff members were involved in training measures as trainers, instructors or advisers. Within the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit, 291 supervisory staff received such training, and 24 supervisory staff were actively involved in providing the training.

VI. Additional information from certain supreme federal authorities and their remits

The following supreme federal authorities have provided additional information on special developments within their remits and to aid in understanding the data supplied to produce this report:

Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media

During the reporting year, the Federal Archives, within the remit of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media, conducted a full threat and risk analysis of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. The previous full review and risk analysis was conducted more than six years before the reporting year and therefore required updating while taking into account changes in organization. The risk analysis showed that in general, there is a low potential risk even in areas particularly vulnerable to corruption and that corruption awareness is high in all organizational units. As regards the internal monitoring system, in general there is a low potential risk. In the few cases where there was a higher potential risk, the necessary preventive measures were taken.

As a result of the threat and risk analysis, senior staff members in positions particularly vulnerable to corruption had to attend in-house training courses conducted by an external coach in 2017.

Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs)

In the course of a reorganization which took effect on 1 January 2016 a concept for a thorough audit of the General Customs Administration was prepared during the reporting year. Previously the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Finance, this task was then assigned to the General Customs Administration. The last time that data were reported was in late 2015 when the risk atlas was updated by the Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs).

Federal Ministry of the Interior

In 2016, the Federal Statistical Office launched a new process of identifying all areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption, which it plans to continue and complete in 2017.

Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection relaunched a process of identifying all areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (threat assessment, risk analysis), which it plans to complete by the end of 2017. Unlike the collection of data from 2011, on which the present report is based, the current analysis also includes the

divisions which have lead or co-responsibility for drafting of bills. The results of the new analysis will therefore not be comparable with the results of the previous one.

Before the cut-off date of the present annual report (31 December 2016), it was possible to complete the analysis for three directorates-general and the top-level management, i.e. for almost half of the workplaces at the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. Almost 43% of the workplaces included in the analysis were identified as especially vulnerable to corruption within the meaning of the Directive, the majority of which were higher service workplaces. While approximately half of the workplaces in units with lead responsibility for the drafting of bills were identified as especially vulnerable to corruption, the share of workplaces with only co-responsibility in the legislative process is about one third. In contrast, the subsequent risk analysis carried out for the directorates-general examined did not find any significant differences between them; in general, the potential risk was considered as generally low.

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

Following reorganization, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development conducted a new full review in 2015 to identify areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption. The resulting risk analysis had not been completed by 31 December 2015, i.e. the cut-off date for the report, but was completed in the 2016 reporting period.

Further workplaces established by 31 December 2016 were also revision in terms of their potential risk of corruption and covered by a risk analysis.

The federal ministry is also in the process of revising and improving its procedures for the risk analysis to classify jobs as especially vulnerable to corruption and for monitoring the length of assignment in areas especially vulnerable to corruption and of any compensatory measures. Among other things, it is intended to apply stricter standards for future classification; moreover, the monitoring process was overhauled to ensure that issues relating to rotation are addressed at an early stage.

VII. The future of corruption prevention – Conclusions and outlook

The supreme federal authorities and their remits, workplaces and other bodies continue to implement the Anti-Corruption Directive to a high degree.

When collecting the data for this report, respondents were also asked to indicate where they saw potential to further develop corruption prevention and which concrete measures had been initiated or already implemented during the reporting year. New implementation directives, organizational measures and measures related to areas of activity/jobs were the most frequently mentioned aspects (see also Annex 4 below).

In the following, some examples from individual authorities will be explained in further detail to show which specific measures they carried out in the reporting year or plan to introduce in the future:

- **Federal Foreign Office:** The Federal Foreign Office has intensified awareness-raising measures for senior staff and extended these measures to include local staff at German diplomatic missions or consular posts in states with a particularly high risk of corruption. On the occasion of the International Anti-Corruption Day, the Federal Foreign Office sent a circular note to all foreign diplomatic missions in Germany, asking them to note that German officials are not allowed to accept gratuities or gifts and therefore to refrain from making such offers to German officials.
- **The Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media (BKM):** One unit within the remit of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media sends an email to all staff members in the run-up to Christmas to raise awareness for corruption, providing information on provisions concerning the acceptance of gratuities or gifts and giving recommendations for conduct. Another executive agency of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media, which used to provide regular training courses for staff members involved in activities especially vulnerable to corruption, has extended the scope of training courses on corruption prevention to include all staff members. In annual staff meetings, various issues of corruption prevention are discussed.
- **Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS):** The German Pension Insurance Miners, Railway and Maritime within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs adopted compliance guidelines in accordance with a decision by the governing board and appointed a compliance advisor. Another executive agency of the BMAS completed an internal survey to identify workplaces especially vulnerable to corruption in the reporting year.

- **Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF):** The Federal Ministry of Finance worded its in-house rules on additional activities more precisely and reviewed prevailing approval practice. The aim is to preserve the public's trust in the independence of the public administration. One executive agency plans to remodel its offices to create an open-plan work space facilitating communication between office workers and peer control at the same time.
- **Federal Ministry of Finance (Customs):** In addition, the General Customs Administration plans to introduce an obligatory e-learning module for corruption prevention training for the custom's administration senior staff.
- **Federal Ministry of Health (BMG):** One executive agency of the Federal Ministry of Health reported that it organizes corruption prevention instruction for initial awareness of new staff members four times a year.
- **Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI):** The Federal Ministry of the Interior implemented various measures to improve corruption prevention in the reporting year. For example, it awarded a contract to a Berlin-based law firm with branch offices in Cologne and Frankfurt a.M. to establish the post of ombudsperson for cases of suspected corruption. The e-learning programme, which every staff member can use for individual corruption prevention training, has been upgraded. The Federal Ministry of the Interior advised several grant recipients on corruption prevention.

The Procurement Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior organized an event for its senior staff involving a keynote speech by the compliance officer of an international company in the reporting year. In her speech, the compliance officer explained how her company deals with cases of corruption. The keynote speaker gave vivid examples and answered many questions from the audience, so that participants gained new insights and learnt a lot. After the positive feedback, the ministry plans to launch an event series exploring issues of anti-corruption. In addition, all staff members attended bribery and corruption awareness training within one calendar year.

The Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) amended the sample specifications of its framework contracts for equipment maintenance to be used by the THW local units and included an anti-corruption clause. By signing such a contract, the contractor declares that

- he, his staff and any subcontractors will not offer, promise or grant or attempt to offer, promise or grant any indirect or direct benefits within the meaning of Section 331 ff. of the Criminal Code to the staff of the contracting authority and that

- he was not involved in any agreement in the context of public bids for the purpose of restricting competition within the meaning of Section 298 of the Criminal Code.

If the contractor fails to comply with this obligation, he must inform the contracting authority. In this case, the contracting authority has a special right of withdrawal from or termination of all contracts with that contractor. The THW also reserves the right to exclude the contractor from future bids or contracts for a certain period of time. In addition, the THW sent its senior staff to a managers' conference in 2016 to attend awareness-raising lectures by a professor for sociology and law.

- **Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV):** In 2016, the Federal Finance Court completed a full review of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption, including the organization's top-level management and the judges. It also organized an awareness-raising event which was obligatory for all staff working in positions particularly vulnerable to corruption. Another executive agency of the federal justice ministry provided all staff with various sample letters which they could use for returning or refusing to accept gratuities or gifts. These sample letters were further developed in 2016.
- **Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi):** An executive agency of the economics ministry invited 25 staff members (including one supervisory staff member) of the procurement unit to a special lecture on corruption prevention.

This overview shows that ideas for improving corruption prevention are developed and implemented in numerous organizations of the public administration.

The introduction of the nationwide competition register was another measure to improve corruption prevention. To this effect, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy prepared the necessary draft legislation for a competition register. In accordance with the procurement law in force it is possible to exclude companies from public contracts or concessions which were involved in economic crimes or other serious crimes, in particular corruption. Compiling a competition register will enable contracting authorities to check a nationwide electronic database to find out whether a company has violated relevant laws and is to be excluded from the contract award procedure.¹⁷ It is planned to set up and maintain the register at the Federal Cartel Office.

¹⁷ See also the website of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, public contracts and awards, competition register for public procurement, available at: <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Wirtschaft/wettbewerbsregister.html>

Another measure to enhance corruption prevention is the further centralization of public procurement by reinforcing central federal procurement offices. It has a positive effect on the obligation to separate the different stages of the procurement procedure: planning, awarding of a contract, and invoicing (see number 11.2 of the Anti-Corruption Directive). This also applies to the procurement of IT infrastructure. At present, a new directorate is being set up at the Procurement Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior which will be responsible for the procurement of IT infrastructure for the entire federal administration. In a first step, it will assume responsibility for public tenders for framework contracts for the direct federal administration. In a second step, it will also assume responsibility for awarding individual contracts exceeding ministry-specific volume thresholds.

For the first time in the reporting year, the Federal Government participated in the international Initiative Open Government Partnership (OGP), which is another step towards transparent administrative and government action. Under the lead responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, an initial national action plan will be drawn up by the middle of 2017 setting out measures from various policy areas relating to key issues of the future. Civil society will be asked every two years to participate in discussing and accompanying these measures to trigger learning processes, build trust and make reform projects visible.¹⁸

The Federal Government is committed to making prevention a key instrument in combating corruption also at international level. The Federal Government has made anti-corruption one of the key issues of its G20 presidency and submitted high-level principles on anti-corruption measures within an organization ("Organizing against corruption") to the G20 working party on anti-corruption. These principles set out how organizational structures and procedures can be designed to strengthen the public administration's resistance against corruption. They are also intended to help reduce the risk of corruption in public administration and identify cases of corruption.

¹⁸ See also the press release of the Federal Ministry of the Interior of 7 December 2016: "Democracy means listening and reaching out", available at: <http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/12/bekanntgabe-der-teilnahme-an-open-government-partnership.html>.

List of Tables

Annex 1: Authorities included in this report

Table a: Supreme federal authorities included in this report

The tables use the abbreviations listed below.

Abbreviation	Name of the supreme federal authority
BMIBMI	Federal Chancellery
BMWi	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
AA	Federal Foreign Office
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
BMJV	Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection
BMF	Federal Ministry of Finance
BMAS	Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
BMEL	Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defence
BMFSFJ	Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
BMG	Federal Ministry of Health
BMVI	Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
BMUB	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety
BMBF	Federal Ministry of Education and Research
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BRH	Federal Court of Audit, Presidential Division
BPA	Press and Information Office of the Federal Government

Abbreviation	Name of the supreme federal authority
BKM	Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media
BPrA	Federal President's Office
BVerfG	Federal Constitutional Court
BT	German Bundestag
BR	Bundesrat
BfDI	Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information

Table b: Executive agencies included in this report

Without the defence remit

Within the remit of the Federal Foreign Office

- German Archaeological Institute

Within the remit of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media

- Academy of Arts
- Federal Archives
- Kulturveranstaltungen des Bundes in Berlin GmbH
- Federal Institute for Culture and History of the Germans in Eastern Europe
- Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation
- Foundation for the Study of the SED Dictatorship
- The Federal Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic
- German National Library
- German Federal Film Board
- Otto von Bismarck Foundation
- Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus Foundation
- Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus Foundation
- Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe
- German Historical Museum Foundation
- Foundation of the Museum of Contemporary History of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Jewish Museum Berlin Foundation
- Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation
- President Friedrich Ebert Foundation Memorial
- Transit Film GmbH

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

- Federal Employment Agency
- Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
- Federal Labour Court
- Federal Social Court
- Federal Insurance Office
- German Federal Pension Insurance
- German Pension Insurance Miners, Railway and Maritime
- Social insurance scheme for agriculture, forestry and horticulture

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research

- Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture

- Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety
- Federal Office for Agriculture and Food
- Federal Institute for Risk Assessment
- Federal Office of Plant Varieties
- German Biomass Research Centre
- Friedrich Loeffler Institute
- Johann Heinrich von Thünen Institute
- Julius Kühn Institute
- Max Rubner Institute – Federal Research Centre for Nutrition and Food

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance (without customs administration)

- Federal Office of Central Services and Unresolved Property Issues and Federal Equalisation of Burdens Office (cumulative data provided for two authorities)
- Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
- Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization
- Institute for Federal Real Estate
- Deutsche Bundespost Federal Posts and Telecommunications Agency
- Federal Republic of Germany – Finanzagentur GmbH
- Federal Central Tax Office
- Energiewerke Nord GmbH (since 2 February 2017 EWN Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen GmbH)
- Lusatian and Central German Mining Management Company
- Museum Foundation Post and Telecommunications
- Federal Disposal Sales and Marketing Agency
- Federal Information Technology Centre (set up on 1 January 2016)
- Federal Spirits Monopoly Administration

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance (customs administration)

- General Customs Administration (GZD) (set up on 1 January 2016)
- Main Customs Offices, Customs Investigation Offices (cumulative data provided for 43 Main Customs Offices and eight Customs Investigation Offices)

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth

- Federal Office of Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions
- Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Health

- Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices
- Federal Centre for Health Education

- German Institute for Medical Documentation and Information
- Paul Ehrlich Institute
- Robert Koch Institute

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior

- Federal Agency for Public Safety Digital Radio (BDBOS)
- Procurement office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior
- Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
- Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
- Federal Office for Information Security
- Federal Agency for Technical Relief
- Federal Institute for Population Research
- Federal Institute of Sport Science
- Federal Criminal Police Office
- Federal Police (cumulative data provided for eleven authorities)
- Federal Police Headquarters
- Federal Office of Administration
- Federal Agency for Civic Education
- Federal University of Administrative Sciences
- Federal Statistical Office

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

- Federal Office of Justice
- Federal Finance Court
- Federal Court of Justice

- Federal Patent Court
- Federal Administrative Court
- Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice
- German Patent and Trade Mark Office

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety

- Asse-GmbH, a federally owned company for the operation and decommissioning of the Asse II repository
- Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning
- Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management
- Federal Agency for Nature Conservation
- Federal Office for Radiation Protection
- Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung mbH (federal agency for nuclear waste disposal (set up in 2016))
- Federal Foundation for Baukultur [the built environment]
- Federal Environmental Agency

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure

- Federal Office for Goods Transport
- Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency
- Federal Institute of Hydrology
- Federal Highway Research Institute
- Federal Agency for Administrative Services
- Federal Institute for Waterway Engineering
- German Air Navigation Services
- Federal Railway Property Agency
- German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation
- Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
- DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH [German air navigation services]

- German Meteorological Service
- Federal Railway Authority
- Federal Waterways and Shipping Agency
- Central Command for Maritime Emergencies
- Federal Motor Transport Authority
- Federal Aviation Office
- NOW GmbH – National Organization for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology
- VIG mbH – Transport Infrastructure Financing Company
- Offices for waterways and shipping and offices for new construction (cumulative data provided for 46 authorities).

Within the remit of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy

- Federal Office of Economics and Export Control
- Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
- Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing
- Federal Cartel Office
- Federal Network Agency
- National Metrology Institute of Germany

Within the remit of the Bundesrechnungshof (Germany's supreme audit institution)

- Administrative staff of the field offices of the Bundesrechnungshof (data were provided all at once for seven authorities)

Annex 2: Implementation of the Directive by the supreme federal authorities

Table a: Areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption and risk analyses

Name of the supreme federal authority	Number of staff as at 31/12/2016	Year of the most recent full review or update of all areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption are based on updates (U), full review (R), on both (B), or are available only for a certain area of the authority (A).	Number of staff in positions especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of jobs especially vulnerable to corruption for which a risk analysis was considered necessary	Number of actually conducted risk analyses
AA	13,514	2016	V	6,772	6,772	6,772
BfDI	101	2011 or earlier	F	31	0	0
BKAmt	693	2015	F	72	72	72
BKM	264	2016	F	129	143	143
BMAS	1,207	2016	F	171	171	171
BMBF	1,121	2016	F	151	9	9
BMEL	975	2012	V	102	0	0
BMF	1,732	2016	G	255	149	149
BMFSFJ	715	2012	V	189	0	0
BMG	571	2016	V	158	91	91
BMI	1,555	2015	G	468	468	468
BMJV	768	2011 or earlier	V	18	23	0
BMUB	1,278	2013	F	221	60	60
BMVI	1,425	2015	V	257	158	158
BMVg	2,793	2016	T	328	328	0
BMWi	1,700	2016	G	383	383	383
BMZ	1,071	2016	G	304	304	304
BPA	470	2015	V	96	96	96
BPrA	197	2016	F	42	7	7
BR	205	2014	G	20	9	0
BRH	234	2013	F	41	39	39
BT	2,952	2016	F	301	301	301
BVerfG	244	2015	T	0	0	0

Table b: Staff rotation in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

Name of the supreme federal authority	Number of staff working in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of these staff having worked for more than five years in the same or similar areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of these staff for whom compensation measures were taken to reduce the risk	Reasons for the failure to rotate ("X" means "Applies to this authority")					
				Specialists who cannot be rotated	Other staff with special skills/knowledge that are difficult to replace (ensuring continuity)	Staff members shortly before retirement from active service	Staff members to be transferred soon to another organizational unit	Staff members without a suitable replacement position at the same pay level Remuneration	Other Reasons
AA	6,772	2,161	2,161	X	X	X	X		X
BfDI	31	20	0	X					
BKAmt	72	29	29	X	X			X	
BKM	129	39	39	X	X	X		X	X
BMAS	171	n.s.							
BMBF	151	66	66	X	X	X	X		X
BMEL	102	n.s.							
BMF	255	75	68	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMFSFJ	189	n.s.							
BMG	158	n.s.							
BMI	468	161	105	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMJV	18	3	3		X				X
BMUB	221	n.s.							
BMVI	257	n.s.							
BMVg	328	0							
BMW i	383	127	127	X	X	X	X		
BMZ	304	42	39	X	X	X	X		X
BPA	96	46	46	X	X	X			
BPrA	42	21	0	X				X	X
BR	20	3	3					X	

BRH	41	23	23	X	X	X	X		X
BT	301	57	49	X	X	X		X	X
BVerfG	0	n.a.							

Table c: Other measures taken to compensate for the failure to rotate¹⁹

Name of the supreme federal authority	Extending the principle of greater scrutiny	Working in teams	Exchanging tasks within an organizational unit (although this does not correspond to rotation as described above)	Transferring responsibilities (with compensatory effect in terms of corruptions risks)	Intensifying administrative and operational supervision	Other Measures
AA	X		X	X	X	X
BfDI	n.a.					
BKAmt	X				X	
BKM	X	X	X		X	X
BMAS	n.a.					
BMBF	X	X			X	X
BMEL	n.a.					
BMF	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMFSFJ	n.a.					
BMG	n.a.					
BMI	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMJV	X			X	X	X
BMUB	n.a.					
BMVI	n.a.					
BMVg	n.a.					
BMWi	X	X	X		X	
BMZ	X	X	X	X	X	
BPA	X	X			X	
BPrA	n.a.					

¹⁹ "X" means "Applies to this authority"

BR	X	X	X		X	
BRH					X	X
BT	X		X	X	X	
BVerfG	n.a.					

Table d: Special regulations (applicable within the authority or to cooperation with the executive agencies)

Name of the supreme federal authority	The authority has special regulations ... ("X" means "Applies to this authority")			... on cooperation with the executive agencies/bodies ... ("X" means "Applies to this authority")			
	... on monitoring staff performance of duties (administrative supervision)	... on monitoring lawfulness and expedience (task-related supervision)	... that are applied especially in all or some fields of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption ²⁰	... on how to deal with cases of suspected corruption	... according to which cases of suspected corruption must be reported	... according to which regular reports on the implementation of the directive on corruption prevention must be provided to the supreme federal authority	... according to which other measures of administrative and task-related supervision are carried out
AA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BfDI				n.a.			
BKAmt	X		X	n.a.			
BKM							X
BMAS	X	X	X			X	X
BMBF			X	n.a.			
BMEL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMFSFJ	X	X		n.a.			
BMG						X	X
BMI	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMJV		X	X	X	X	X	
BMUB	X	X	X	X	X		X
BMVI	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMVg	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMWi	X	X	X	X	X		

²⁰ Examples include special tests, special conditions for awarding contracts or the publication of risk atlases

BMZ	X	X	X	n.a.			
BPA				n.a.			
BPrA			X	n.a.			
BR				n.a.			
BRH			X	X	X		
BT	X	X	X	n.a.			
BVerfG	X	X		n.a.			

Table e: Principle of greater scrutiny and transparency

Name of the supreme federal authority	Measures taken to support the principle of greater scrutiny and transparency ("X" means "Applies to this authority")			IT-assisted workflows which (perhaps in addition to other advantages) also ensure compliance with the principle of greater scrutiny ... ²¹ ("X" means "Applies to this authority")						
	Second staff member checking work results	Plausibility checks	IT-assisted workflows	... procurement measures	... to award funds (institutional funding; project funding)	... to settle benefit claims pursuant to civil service law	... to settle travel expenses	... for other measures with budgetary or other financial impact	... to issue other administrative acts or ... to issue administrative decisions relevant to the public	Other Dossiers
AA	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X
BfDI		X	X	X						X
BKAmt	X	X	X	X				X		
BKM	X	X	X				X	X		
BMAS	X	X	X				X			
BMBF	X	X	X	X	X			X		
BMEL	X	X	X	X	X			X		
BMF	X	X	X	X			X	X		
BMFSFJ	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		
BMG	X	X	X	X			X	X		
BMI	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
BMJV	X	X	X				X			
BMUB	X	X	X		X		X			

²¹ Some authorities have other authorities assume these tasks; no X was used in these cases, even if the delegated authority uses IT-assisted workflows.)

BMVI	X	X	X	X			X	X		
BMVg	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMWi	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
BMZ	X	X	X	X						
BPA	X	X	X							X
BPrA	X	X								
BR		X	X	X			X			
BRH	X	X	X	X				X		
BT	X	X	X				X	X		X
BVerfG	X	X								

Table f: Contacts between the contact persons for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level

Name of the supreme federal authority	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level ("X" means "Applies to this authority")			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level ("X" means "Applies to this authority")		
	No specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	Specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	Contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
AA	X					X
BfDI	No contacts within the reporting year.					
BKAmt	X				X	
BKM			X		X	
BMAS	X				X	
BMBF	No contacts within the reporting year.					
BMEL	X					X
BMF	X					X
BMFSFJ	No contacts within the reporting year.					
BMG	No contacts within the reporting year.					
BMI	X				X	
BMJV			X		X	
BMUB	No contacts within the reporting year.					

BMVI	X				X	
BMVg		X				
BMWi			X		X	
BMZ	X					X
BPA	No contacts within the reporting year.					
BPrA	X				X	
BR	X				X	
BRH			X		X	
BT	X			X		
BVerfG			X		X	

Table g: Corruption awareness and workshops

Name of the supreme federal authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied (other than workshops) ("X" means "Applies to this authority")							Workshops carried out in 2016 (number of staff who attended workshops)
	Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with the contact person for corruption prevention	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events ²²	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other Measures	
AA	13,514	6,772	656	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	764
BfDI	0	-	-								-
BKAmt	693	72	102						X		31
BKM	31	17	0		X	X		X	X		3
BMAS	117	23	17				X		X		25
BMBF	226	32	0	X	X	X	X	X	X		9
BMEL	1	1	-		X			X	X		1

²² such as orientation for new employees

BMF	134	-	18	X	X	X	X		X	X	0
BMFSFJ	20	1	1				X	X			0
BMG	24	4	1			X	X		X		4
BMI	900	468	102	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	92
BMJV	92	0	1	X	X	X	X		X	X	1
BMUB	180	20	2		X		X	X	X	X	1
BMVI	1,425	-	154	X	X		X		X	X	271
BMVg	2,063	312	225	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	15
BMWi	135	-	0	X	X	X	X		X		1
BMZ	1,071	304	89	X	X		X	X	X	X	31
BPA	31	0	0	X		X			X		0
BPrA	18	6	2	X	X	X	X		X		0
BR	0	-	-								-
BRH	11	3	2		X		X		X		0
BT	1,657	301	197	X	X	X	X		X		50
BVerfG	133	-	4		X		X		X		0

Annex 3: Implementation of the Directive by the executive agencies of the federal ministries

Table a: Areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption and risk analyses

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities as at 31/12/2016	Number of staff as at 31/12/2016	Number of authorities with available data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of staff working in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (in brackets, if appropriate: number of staff in authorities without available data)	Number of jobs especially vulnerable to corruption for which a risk analysis was considered necessary	Number of risk analyses carried out
AA	Not attributable to a certain level	1	347	1	47	47	46
BKM	Higher federal authorities	3	2,252	3	112	91	91

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities as at 31/12/2016	Number of staff as at 31/12/2016	Number of authorities with available data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of staff working in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (in brackets, if appropriate: number of staff in authorities without available data)	Number of jobs especially vulnerable to corruption for which a risk analysis was considered necessary	Number of risk analyses carried out
BKM	Legal person under private law	2	384	1	94 (3)	94	94
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level	14	3,704	12	409 (405)	264	92
BMAS	Higher federal authorities	1	592	1	383	367	367
BMAS	Federal courts	2	351	2	22	16	6
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level	5	147,885	2	3,434 (124,387)	3,434	2,401
BMBF	Not attributable to a certain level	1	694	1	89	0	0
BMEL	Higher federal authorities	6	4,393	6	390	102	98
BMEL	Legal person under private law	1	205	0	(205)		
BMEL	Not attributable to a certain level	2	2,095	2	878	32	6
BMF	Higher federal authorities	4	4,069	4	2,538	323	321
BMF	Legal person under private law	4	1,822	4	523	19	10
BMF	Not attributable to a certain level	6	12,514	5	3,410	4,392	4,315

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities as at 31/12/2016	Number of staff as at 31/12/2016	Number of authorities with available data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of staff working in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (in brackets, if appropriate: number of staff in authorities without available data)	Number of jobs especially vulnerable to corruption for which a risk analysis was considered necessary	Number of risk analyses carried out
BMF (Customs)	Higher federal authorities	1	6,729	0	(6.729)		
BMF (Customs Administration)	Lower federal authorities	51	31,167	51	971	30	27
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities	2	1,345	2	362	331	325
BMG	Higher federal authorities	5	3,355	5	960	620	473
BMI	Higher federal authorities	12	28,474	12	11,612	4,597	3,769
BMI	Lower federal authorities	11	33,299	11	1,672	1,672	1,672
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level	3	475	3	188	188	188
BMJV	Higher federal authorities	3	3,793	3	1,411	1,258	1,411
BMJV	Federal courts	4	869	4	177	70	63
BMUB	Higher federal authorities	5	3,951	4	2,614 (15)	1,819	284
BMUB	Legal person under private law	2	479	1	31 (4)	10	3
BMUB	Not attributable to a certain level	1	7	0	(7)		

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities as at 31/12/2016	Number of staff as at 31/12/2016	Number of authorities with available data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption	Number of staff working in areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (in brackets, if appropriate: number of staff in authorities without available data)	Number of jobs especially vulnerable to corruption for which a risk analysis was considered necessary	Number of risk analyses carried out
BMVI	Higher federal authorities	14	9,243	12	3,481 (253)	1,312	1,259
BMVI	Intermediate federal authorities	1	873	1	478	478	478
BMVI	Lower federal authorities	46	11,207	46	3,309	2,445	2,445
BMVI	Legal person under private law	3	5,580	2	425 (21)	20	20
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level	1	695	1	43	9	9
BMVg	Higher federal authorities	19	21,180	16	1,866 (1,260)	1,782	1,773
BMVg	Intermediate federal authorities	116	47,069	94	809 (7,547)	647	539
BMVg	Lower federal authorities	536	144,048	233	2,515 (43,399)	912	700
BMVg	Federal courts	2	41	1	- (23)	-	-
BMVg	Legal person under private law	4	1,467	3	67 (645)	17	17
BMW i	Higher federal authorities	6	8,410	6	3,033	592	466
BRH	Higher federal authorities	7	46	7	0	0	0

Table b: Update of the data basis on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities which updated their data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in ... (in brackets number of staff in these authorities)			
		2016	2015 / 2014	2013 / 2012	2011 or earlier
AA	Not attributable to a certain level				1 (347)
BKM	Higher federal authorities	2 (681)	1 (1,571)		
BKM	Legal person under private law	1 (381)			
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level	4 (2,957)	3 (172)	4 (106)	1 (64)
BMAS	Higher federal authorities				1 (592)
BMAS	Federal courts		1 (187)		1 (164)
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level	1 (22,793)	1 (705)		
BMBF	Not attributable to a certain level	1 (694)			
BMEL	Higher federal authorities	2 (1,477)	2 (1,565)	1 (558)	1 (793)
BMEL	Legal person under private law				
BMEL	Not attributable to a certain level		1 (1,240)	1 (855)	
BMF	Higher federal authorities	4 (4,069)			
BMF	Legal person under private law	4 (1,822)			
Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF)	Not attributable to a certain level	1 (2,552)	2 (7,058)	2 (2,784)	

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities which updated their data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in ... (in brackets number of staff in these authorities)			
		2016	2015 / 2014	2013 / 2012	2011 or earlier
BMF (Customs Administration)	Higher federal authorities				
BMF (Customs Administration)	Lower federal authorities		51 (31,167)		
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities		1 (1,326)	1 (19)	
BMG	Higher federal authorities		2 (1,185)	2 (1,424)	1 (746)
BMI	Higher federal authorities	1 (3,743)	3 (5,929)	4 (5,620)	4 (13,182)
BMI	Lower federal authorities			11 (33,299)	
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level	1 (395)			2 (80)
BMJV	Higher federal authorities	2 (3,547)	1 (246)		
BMJV	Federal courts	2 (371)	2 (498)		
BMUB	Higher federal authorities	1 (833)	1 (1,589)	1 (1,166)	1 (348)
BMUB	Legal person under private law		1 (475)		
BMUB	Not attributable to a certain level				
BMVI	Higher federal authorities	4 (5,470)	5 (1,799)	3 (1,721)	
BMVI	Intermediate federal authorities		1 (873)		
BMVI	Lower federal authorities	46 (11,207)			
BMVI	Legal person under private law	2 (5,559)			

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities which updated their data on areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption in ... (in brackets number of staff in these authorities)			
		2016	2015 / 2014	2013 / 2012	2011 or earlier
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level	1 (695)			
BMVg	Higher federal authorities	4/n.s.	7/n.s.	3/n.s.	2/n.s.
BMVg	Intermediate federal authorities	41/n.s.	43/n.s.	6/n.s.	4/n.s.
BMVg	Lower federal authorities	128/n.s.	61/n.s.	21/n.s.	23/n.s.
BMVg	Federal courts		1/n.s.		
BMVg	Legal person under private law	1/n.s.	1/n.s.		1/n.s.
BMWi	Higher federal authorities	1 (879)	2 (4,873)		3 (2,658)
BRH	Higher federal authorities			7 (46)	

Table c: Staff rotation in the executive agencies

Current data are available only for the remits and levels listed

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities for which relevant data are available	Number of staff in these authorities	Number of these staff having worked for more than five years in the same or similar areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (where data are available)	Number of these staff for whom compensation measures were taken to reduce the risk	Reason for the failure to rotate (number of authorities having stated the respective reason) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
						Specialists who cannot be rotated	Other staff with special skills/ knowledge that are difficult to replace (ensuring continuity)	Staff retiring soon from active duty	Staff to be transferred soon to another Organizational unit	Staff without a suitable replacement position at the same pay level	Other reasons
AA	Not attributable to a certain level	1	347	25	25	1				1	
BKM	Higher federal authorities	3	2,252	14	0	-	-	-	-	-	1
BKM	Legal person under private law	2	384	66	66	1	1	1	-	1	-
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level	14	3,704	256	38	9	6	2	-	5	-
BMAS	Higher federal authorities	1	592	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMAS	Federal courts	2	351	19	19	1	1			1	1
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level	5	147,885	119	119	1	1	1	-	-	-
BMBF	Not attributable to a certain level	1	694	67	0	1	1	-	-	-	-

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities for which relevant data are available	Number of staff in these authorities	Number of these staff having worked for more than five years in the same or similar areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (where data are available)	Number of these staff for whom compensation measures were taken to reduce the risk	Reason for the failure to rotate (number of authorities having stated the respective reason) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
						Specialists who cannot be rotated	Other staff with special skills/ knowledge that are difficult to replace (ensuring continuity)	Staff retiring soon from active duty	Staff to be transferred soon to another Organizational unit	Staff without a suitable replacement position at the same pay level	Other reasons
BMEL	Higher federal authorities	6	4,393	72	72	1	2	-	-	1	1
BMEL	Legal person under private law	1	205	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMEL	Not attributable to a certain level	2	2,095	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMF	Higher federal authorities	4	4,069	3	3	1	1	-	-	-	-
BMF	Legal person under private law	4	1,822	202	192	4	4	1	1	2	2
BMF	Not attributable to a certain level	6	12,514	1,013	1,008	4	4	1	1	2	2
BMF (Customs Administration)	Higher federal authorities	1	6,729	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMF (Customs)	Lower federal authorities	51	31,167	305	273	X	X	X	X	X	X

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities for which relevant data are available	Number of staff in these authorities	Number of these staff having worked for more than five years in the same or similar areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (where data are available)	Number of these staff for whom compensation measures were taken to reduce the risk	Reason for the failure to rotate (number of authorities having stated the respective reason) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
						Specialists who cannot be rotated	Other staff with special skills/ knowledge that are difficult to replace (ensuring continuity)	Staff retiring soon from active duty	Staff to be transferred soon to another Organizational unit	Staff without a suitable replacement position at the same pay level	Other reasons
Administration)*											
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities	2	1,345	3	3	1	-	-	-	1	-
BMG	Higher federal authorities	5	3,355	303	165	3	3	2	2	1	-
BMI	Higher federal authorities	12	28,474	1,437	1,146	6	7	6	3	5	2
BMI	Lower federal authorities	11	33,299	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level	3	475	13	6	2	1	1	-	1	-
BMJV	Higher federal authorities	3	3,793	900	900	2	2	1	1	1	-
BMJV	Federal courts	4	869	52	41	2	3	-	-	4	2
BMUB	Higher federal authorities	5	3,951	259	259	2	2	1	1	1	1
BMUB	Legal person under private	2	479	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities for which relevant data are available	Number of staff in these authorities	Number of these staff having worked for more than five years in the same or similar areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption (where data are available)	Number of these staff for whom compensation measures were taken to reduce the risk	Reason for the failure to rotate (number of authorities having stated the respective reason) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
						Specialists who cannot be rotated	Other staff with special skills/ knowledge that are difficult to replace (ensuring continuity)	Staff retiring soon from active duty	Staff to be transferred soon to another Organizational unit	Staff without a suitable replacement position at the same pay level	Other reasons
	law										
BMUB	Not attributable to a certain level	1	7	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMVI	Higher federal authorities	14	9,243	227	227	4	4	3	1	3	-
BMVI	Intermediate federal authorities	1	873	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMVI*	Lower federal authorities	46	11,207	2,157	1,865	X	X	X	X	X	-
BMVI	Legal person under private law	3	5,580	7	0	1	1	-	-	-	-
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level	1	695	30	30	1	1	1	1	1	-
BMVg	Higher federal authorities	19	21,180	30	11	4	3	1	1	4	2
BMVg	Intermediate federal	116	47,069	110	63	15	16	3	2	11	3

Table d: Other measures taken to compensate for the failure to rotate

Current data are available only for the remits and levels listed

Executive agencies	Level of authority (in brackets number of authorities for which data on compensatory measures are available)	Number of authorities having stated that they carry out these compensatory measures *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
		Extending the principle of greater scrutiny	Working in teams	Exchanging tasks within an organizational unit	Transferring responsibilities (with compensatory effect in terms of corruptions risks)	Intensifying administrative and operational supervision	Other Measures
AA	Not attributable to a certain level (1)	1	-	-	-	1	-
BKM	Legal person under private law (1)	1	1	-	-	1	1
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level (6)	6	2	-	1	5	-
BMAS	Federal courts (1)	1	-	1	1	1	-
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level (1)	1	1	-	-	1	-
BMEL	Higher federal authorities (3)	3	1	-	-	1	1
BMF	Higher federal authorities (1)	1	1	1	-	1	1
BMF	Legal person under private law (4)	4	2	1	1	4	2

Executive agencies	Level of authority (in brackets number of authorities for which data on compensatory measures are available)	Number of authorities having stated that they carry out these compensatory measures *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
		Extending the principle of greater scrutiny	Working in teams	Exchanging tasks within an organizational unit	Transferring responsibilities (with compensatory effect in terms of corruptions risks)	Intensifying administrative and operational supervision	Other Measures
BMF	Not attributable to a certain level (3)	3	1	1	2	3	2
BMF (Customs Administration)*	Lower federal authorities (51)	X	X	X	X	X	X
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities (1)	1	1	-	-	1	-
BMG	Higher federal authorities (2)	2	1	-	1	1	-
BMI	Higher federal authorities (6)	6	5	4	3	6	3
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level (1)	1	-	-	1	1	-
BMJV	Higher federal authorities (2)	2	1	1	-	2	1
BMJV	Federal courts (4)	3	-	1	1	3	2
BMUB	Higher federal authorities (2)	2	1	1	1	2	1

Executive agencies	Level of authority (in brackets number of authorities for which data on compensatory measures are available)	Number of authorities having stated that they carry out these compensatory measures *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. ("X" means "Applies to this group")					
		Extending the principle of greater scrutiny	Working in teams	Exchanging tasks within an organizational unit	Transferring responsibilities (with compensatory effect in terms of corruptions risks)	Intensifying administrative and operational supervision	Other Measures
BMVI	Higher federal authorities (5)	5	3	3	2	3	1
BMVI*	Lower federal authorities (46)	X	X	X	-	X	X
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level (1)	1	1	-	1	1	-
BMVg	Higher federal authorities (19)	1	-	-	-	1	2
BMVg	Intermediate federal authorities (116)	10	2	-	1	11	3
BMVg	Lower federal authorities (536)	33	14	6	12	33	9
BMVg	Legal person under private law (4)	-	1	-	-	1	1
BMWi	Higher federal authorities (3)	3	1	3	1	3	-

Table e: Special regulations; administrative and task-related supervision

Administrative and operational supervision is exercised only in the executive agencies listed.

Executive agencies	Number of authorities which have special regulations ...			Number of authorities which exercise operational supervision of other authorities	Number of authorities which have regulations on cooperation with the executive agencies / bodies ...			
	... on monitoring staff performance of duties (administrative supervision)	... on monitoring lawfulness and expedience (operational supervision)	... that are applied especially in all or some fields of areas of activity especially vulnerable to corruption		... on how to deal with cases of suspected corruption	... according to which cases of suspected corruption must be reported	... according to which executive agencies/ bodies of the supervisory authority must provide regular reports on the implementation of the directive on corruption prevention	... according to which other measures of administrative and task-related supervision are carried out
AA	-	1	1	-	n.a.			
BKM	4	3	3	-	n.a.			
BMAS	5	5	4	1	-	-	-	-
BMEL	6	6	4	-	n.a.			
BMF	9	8	11	1	-	-	-	1
BMF (Customs)	52	52	52	1	1	1	1	1
BMFSFJ	1	1	1	-	n.a.			
BMG	3	3	4	-	n.a.			
BMI	20	21	19	1	1	1	1	1
BMJV	4	4	6	-	n.a.			
BMUB	3	3	2	2	1	1	0	1
BMVI	62	62	57	3	2	2	2	3
BMVg	547	227	91	167	109	114	62	90
BMWi	4	3	4	-	n.a.			
BRH	-	-	7	-	n.a.			

Table f: Principle of greater scrutiny and transparency

Executive agencies	Number of authorities where the following measures were taken to support the principle of greater scrutiny and transparency			Number of authorities where IT-assisted workflows are in place (Please note: Some authorities have other authorities assume these tasks completely; in these cases, the delegating authority was not counted even if the delegated authority uses IT-assisted workflows.)						
	Second staff member checking work results; plausibility checks; IT-assisted workflows	Plausibility checks	IT-assisted workflows	procurement measures	... to award funds (institutional funding; project funding)	... to settle benefit claims pursuant to civil service law	... to settle travel expenses	... for other measures with budgetary or other financial impact	... to enact other administrative acts or administrative decisions relevant to the public	... other processes
AA	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
BKM	17	14	8	6	1	1	5	6	1	4
BMAS	7	7	6	5	-	2	3	5	3	-
BMBF	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1
BMEL	8	8	8	6	2	1	5	3	2	5
BMF	13	13	10	7	1	3	6	3	2	6
BMF (Customs)	52	52	52	52	-	1	52	52	51	52
BMFSFJ	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
BMG	5	4	5	3	1	1	3	3	1	3
BMI	23	25	26	24	5	13	17	24	17	18
BMJV	6	7	5	3	-	-	3	2	3	2
BMUB	7	7	6	6	3	-	6	3	2	2
BMVI	61	65	64	60	3	1	63	54	51	50
BMVg	400	428	456	260	20	36	237	371	23	119
BMWi	6	5	6	6	1	1	5	5	3	1
BRH	-	7	7	7	-	-	-	7	-	-

Table g: Contact person for corruption prevention

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
AA	Not attributable to a certain level	1 / 347	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
BKM	Higher federal authorities	3 / 32,252	-	-	1	-	2	2	1	-
BKM	Legal person under private law	2 / 384	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level	14 / 3,704	-	-	9	2	1	2	5	3
BMAS	Higher federal authorities	1 / 592	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
BMAS	Federal courts	2 / 351	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level	4 / 38,752	-	-	4	-	-	1	3	-

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
BMBF	Not attributable to a certain level	1 / 694	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
BMEL	Higher federal authorities	6 / 4,393	-	-	3	-	3	-	2	4
BMEL	Legal person under private law	1 / 205	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
BMEL	Not attributable to a certain level	2 / 2,095	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
BMF	Higher federal authorities	4 / 4,069	-	-	4	-	-	3	1	-
BMF	Legal person under private law	4 / 1,822	-	-	3	-	1	1	3	-
BMF	Not attributable to a certain level	6 / 12,514	-	-	1	-	4	-	2	3

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
BMF (Customs)	Higher federal authorities	1 / 6,729	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
BMF (Customs)	Lower federal authorities	51 / 31,167	-	-	51	-	-	51	-	-
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities	1 / 1,326	1 / 19	-	-	-	-	n.a.		
BMG	Higher federal authorities	5 / 3,355	-	-	2	2	-	1	-	1
BMI	Higher federal authorities	12 / 28,474	-	-	5	-	5	4	5	1
BMI	Lower federal authorities	11 / 33,299	-	-	11	-	-	-	11	-
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level	1 / 395	2 / 80	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
BMJV	Higher federal authorities	3 / 3,793	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	1

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
BMJV	Federal courts	4 / 869	-	-	3	1	-	-	3	-
BMUB	Higher federal authorities	4 / 3,936	1 / 15		3	-	1	1	2	1
BMUB	Legal person under private law	1 / 475	-	1 / 4	-	-	1	1	-	-
BMUB	Not attributable to a certain level	1 / 7	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
BMVI	Higher federal authorities	12 / 8,990	2 / 253	-	6	1	5	3	6	2
BMVI	Intermediate federal authorities	1 / 873	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
BMVI	Lower federal authorities	-	46 / 11,207	-	-	-	-	n.a.		
BMVI	Legal person under private	3 / 5,580	-	-	3	-	-	1	2	-

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
	law									
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level	1 / 695	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
BMVg	Higher federal authorities	17/n.s.	-	2/n.s.	12	4	1	7	6	2
BMVg	Intermediate federal authorities	12/n.s.	103/n.s.	-	58	12	27	37	36	19
BMVg	Lower federal authorities	248/n.s.	255/n.s.	21/n.s.	173	26	29	92	93	38
BMVg	Federal courts	-	1/n.s.	1/n.s.	-	1	-	n.a.		
BMVg	Legal person under private law	3/n.s.		1/n.s.	-	-	2	1	-	1
BMWi	Higher federal authorities	6 / 8,410	-	-	4	1	1	1	3	1

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Number of authorities that have their own contact person/□ number of staff in these authorities (If a contact person has been allocated to a group of authorities, it is covered by this section.)	Number of authorities where the contact person was affiliated to another authority/ Number of staff in these authorities	Number of authorities that did not have their own contact person/ Number of staff in these authorities	Reason for contacts between the contact person for corruption prevention and the authority's executive level□ (number of contact persons)			Frequency of regular contacts between the contact person and the authority's executive level (number of contact persons)		
					... no specific reason (e.g. within the context of a "jour fixe", or as a general report or exchange on corruption prevention).	... exclusively for a specific reason (e.g. a case of suspected corruption).	... contacts with and without specific reason	Once a month or more often	Less than once a month, but at least once every six months	Less than once every six months, but at least once a year
BRH	Higher federal authorities	-	7 / 46	-	-	-	-	n.a.		

Table h: Corruption awareness and workshops

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied – other than workshops (number of authorities) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. (“X” means “Applies to this group”)							Workshops offered in the 2016 calendar year (number of trained staff)
		Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training (if statistical data are available)	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with contact person for preventing corruption	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events (such as orientation for new employees)	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other measures	
AA	Not attributable to a certain level	347	47	57	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	0
BKM	Higher federal authorities	61	3	5	2	2	1	-	-	1	1	1
BKM	Legal person under private law	383	30	2	2	1	1	1	-	1	1	33
BKM	Not attributable to a certain level	731	205	192	5	8	3	5	2	-	2	205
BMAS	Higher federal authorities	54	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	27
BMAS	Federal courts	351	22	43	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	29

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied – other than workshops (number of authorities) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. (“X” means “Applies to this group”)							Workshops offered in the 2016 calendar year (number of trained staff)
		Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training (if statistical data are available)	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with contact person for preventing corruption	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events (such as orientation for new employees)	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other measures	
BMAS	Not attributable to a certain level	15.853	3.396	1.196	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	374
BMBF	Not attributable to a certain level	694	89	46	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	0
BMEL	Higher federal authorities	713	77	232	-	3	-	3	1	1	3	52
BMEL	Legal person under private law	157	-	13	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	157
BMEL	Not attributable to a certain level	187	187	4	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	187
BMF	Higher federal authorities	2.851	1.753	228	2	2	2	1	-	1	4	2
BMF	Legal person under private law	1.725	523	142	2	3	-	1	-	2	1	332

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied – other than workshops (number of authorities) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. (“X” means “Applies to this group”)							Workshops offered in the 2016 calendar year (number of trained staff)
		Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training (if statistical data are available)	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with contact person for preventing corruption	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events (such as orientation for new employees)	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other measures	
BMF	Not attributable to a certain level	7,840	3,152	690	3	5	1	3	1	2	5	869
BMF (Customs)	Higher federal authorities	21	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	0
BMF* (Customs)	Lower federal authorities	6,324	307	504	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1,134
BMFSFJ	Higher federal authorities	372	115	34	2	-	1	2	2	1	1	32
BMG	Higher federal authorities	1,996	701	89	2	5	2	4	3	5	1	200
BMI	Higher federal authorities	14,001	7,777	699	7	11	5	9	6	9	3	927
BMI*	Lower federal authorities	12,087	1,154	1,554	X	X	-	X	X	X	-	3,275

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied – other than workshops (number of authorities) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. (“X” means “Applies to this group”)							Workshops offered in the 2016 calendar year (number of trained staff)
		Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training (if statistical data are available)	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with contact person for preventing corruption	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events (such as orientation for new employees)	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other measures	
BMI	Not attributable to a certain level	165	54	9	1	2	2	2	-	3	-	1
BMJV	Higher federal authorities	1,279	273	140	2	2	2	-	1	2	2	1,033
BMJV	Federal courts	534	103	65	1	1	-	2	2	3	-	2
BMUB	Higher federal authorities	393	265	19	3	3	1	2	2	2	-	200
BMUB	Legal person under private law	25	25	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	25
BMUB	Not attributable to a certain level	7	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0
BMVI	Higher federal authorities	6,961	3,118	463	12	12	8	12	8	12	3	1,449

Executive agencies	Level of the authority	Corruption-awareness measures, including workshops, conducted in the 2016 calendar year			Corruption-awareness measures applied – other than workshops (number of authorities) *) In terms of data collection, some authorities were treated as groups. (“X” means “Applies to this group”)							Workshops offered in the 2016 calendar year (number of trained staff)
		Number of staff who received corruption-awareness training	Number of staff working in jobs especially vulnerable to corruption who received corruption-awareness training (if statistical data are available)	Number of supervisors and managers who received corruption-awareness training	Discussion with superiors	Discussion with contact person for preventing corruption	Discussion with the department/division responsible for HR and organizational matters	Corruption-awareness measures – no workshops – taken during employee events (such as orientation for new employees)	IT-assisted offerings (no workshops)	Handing out information material (instead of simply displaying it)	Other measures	
BMVI	Intermediate federal authorities	389	207	28	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	67
BMVI*	Lower federal authorities	4,299	2,165	255	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	988
BMVI	Legal person under private law	399	374	57	3	3	1	2	-	2	-	379
BMVI	Not attributable to a certain level	695	43	79	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1
BMVg	Higher federal authorities	18,441	1,857	1,306	-	12	13	5	9	12	7	143
BMVg	Intermediate federal authorities	30,557	723	2,265	56	61	12	34	38	51	25	402
BMVg	Lower federal authorities	79,299	1,808	3,621	144	172	29	197	68	221	95	1,804

Annex 4: Further development of corruption prevention measures

Total federal administration (not including the Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit)

Action	Number of workplace which in 2016 ...		
	... planned (adopted) specific corruption-prevention measures	... launched corruption-prevention measures	... implemented corruption-prevention measures
New implementation directives	8	11	7
New training measures	97	22	6
Organizational measures	25	90	8
Area- and job-related measures	20	21	11
Ombudsperson	2	7	4
Electronic whistle-blowing option	5	7	8
Other	5	9	5

Federal Ministry of Defence and its remit

Action	Number of workplace which in 2016 ...		
	... planned (adopted) specific corruption-prevention measures	... launched corruption-prevention measures	... implemented corruption-prevention measures
New implementation directives	29	39	8
New training measures	89	37	6
Organizational measures	58	39	25
Area- and job-related measures	31	21	47
Ombudsperson	1	-	-
Electronic whistle-blowing option	46	36	21

Action	Number of workplace which in 2016 ...		
	... planned (adopted) specific corruption-prevention measures	... launched corruption- prevention measures	... implemented corruption- prevention measures
Other	34	19	12