



Federal Ministry
of the Interior

2012 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Summary



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Note

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1. Politically motivated crime¹

In 2012, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 27,440 politically motivated crimes (2011: 30,216). This figure includes 13,524 (49.3%) propaganda offences (2011: 12,771, or 42.3%). Another 2,464 of these (9.0%) are categorized as politically motivated violent crimes (2011: 3,108, or 10.3%); 21,265 offences (77.5% of politically motivated crimes) were found to have an extremist background (2011: 21,610, or 71.5%). Thus, crimes with an extremist background are also a form of politically motivated crime.

In the area of **right-wing politically motivated crime**, 17,134 (2011: 16,142) criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background. Of these, 802 (2011: 755) were violent crimes. Criminal offences motivated by right-wing extremism increased by 6.1%, and violent offences increased by 6.2%. Violent crimes made up 4.7% of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2011: 4.7%). Of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 81.4% (2011: 80.6%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (12,219; 2011: 11,401) or incitement to hatred (1,733; 2011: 1,605). Overall, 189 offences (2011: 217) fell into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, and 66 offences (2011: 61) fell into the category of violent crimes against other political opponents.

In 2012, 6,191 criminal offences were classified as **left-wing politically motivated crimes** (2011: 8,687). Of these, 1,291 (2011: 1,809) were violent offences. In 3,229 cases (2011: 4,502), including 876 violent crimes (2011: 1,157), there were indications of a left-wing extremist background. The number of criminal offences with a left-wing extremist background fell by 28.3%. The number of violent crimes with a left-wing extremist background decreased again in 2012 (by 24.3%) after reaching its highest level in 2011 since the introduction of the new classification for politically motivated crime in 2001. Of left-wing politically motivated violent crimes with an extremist background, 471 (2011: 700) offences fell into the category of violent crimes against police/security authorities, 405 (2011: 546) into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed right-wing extremists, and 32 offences (2011: 122) were related to protests against urban renewal.

In the area of **politically motivated crime by foreigners**, 618 (2011: 730) criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background. Of these, 117 (2011: 191) were violent crimes. The number of politically motivated crimes by foreigners with an extremist background thus fell by 15.3%, The number of violent crimes fell by 38.7%.

¹ The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

In 284 cases (2011: 236), there were indications of an extremist background, but the offences could not be assigned to a particular category.

2. Right-wing extremism

With a total of 22,150 members, the right-wing extremist following in Germany once again contracted in 2012 (2011: 22,400; 2010: 25,000). This was mainly owing to shrinking membership of the political parties. At a total of 9,600 persons, the number of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence fell slightly (2011: 9,800; 2010: 9,500). With a total of 6,000, the number of neo-Nazis remained the same as in the previous year (2011: 6,000; 2010: 5,600).

The number of right-wing extremist **rallies** fell considerably after it had reached its highest level so far in the previous year (2012: 211; 2011: 260), with a most significant decrease in the number of neo-Nazi events (2012: 95; 2011: 167).

One priority of BfV investigators is monitoring **violence-prone right-wing extremists**. Although rather small in numbers, individuals belonging to the extreme right wing are prepared to commit terrorist acts in order to achieve their own political goals. BfV investigations therefore concentrate on individuals, making targeted use of intelligence technologies and sharing relevant information with their counterpart agencies at state level, in order to intervene at the earliest opportunity and prevent both individuals or micro groups from further radicalizing, and neutralize terrorist structures as soon as they stir.

In executive measures taken against the right-wing extremist scene in 2012, including banning six neo-Nazi groups by the responsible interior ministers of the federal states concerned, investigators gathered evidence for right-wing extremists' **possession of or strong affinity with weapons**.

Particularly by organizing events the **neo-Nazi scene** tries to attract mainly young people and recruit them as followers; in this way, these young people get in touch with neo-Nazis and their ideology. From the perspective of neo-Nazi groups, this event-oriented approach has proved very successful also for recruiting right-wing extremists looking for adventure who are attracted by the subculture, especially the music.

Violence, affinity with weapons, hostile stereotypes and combat readiness are immanent in neo-Nazi ideology. As a consequence, individual followers of this ideology or smaller groups of them may make intentional and targeted use of violence.

In previous years, BfV investigators noted a disintegration of neo-Nazi structures. This trend has continued. The majority of mostly regional groups do without fixed

organizational structures as a way to render procedures to ban an association difficult, among other things.

The membership of the **National-Democratic Party** (NPD) continued to shrink following years of decline, also under the party chairman Holger Apfel. At the end of 2012, the NPD had 6,000 members (2011: 6,300). After taking office at the end of 2011 Apfel was not able to launch a party reform. Poor election results, internal criticism which did not spare the party chairman and the precarious financial situation have put the NPD under increasing pressure. On 14 December 2012 the Federal Council (Bundesrat) decided to initiate proceedings to establish the unconstitutionality of the NPD.

In late May 2012 the neo-Nazi Christian Worch founded the **party DIE RECHTE** (The right) and has acted as party chairman since then. Another two neo-Nazis also belong to the party's national Executive Committee. In particular, the largest and most active regional unit in North Rhine-Westphalia is dominated by neo-Nazis; several former members of banned neo-Nazi groups hold important posts. At the end of 2012 the party had two regional and six local units.

The major focus and area of activity of the **Bürgerbewegung "pro NRW"** (citizens' movement "pro NRW") is the fight against the supposed threat that Germany or even Europe will be dominated by Muslims. With their provocative campaign for the state parliamentary election in North Rhine-Westphalia in May 2012, the Bürgerbewegung pro NRW sparked violent riots in Solingen and Bonn among violence-prone Salafists who felt provoked by Mohammed cartoons. Salafist rioters toppled police barricades, threw stones at people attending a pro NRW rally and at police officers as well as bystanders and hit them with flagpoles. A total of 31 police officers were injured, some of them seriously. Such escalation of violence on the part of Salafist activists is unparalleled so far and marks the birth of a new form of action motivated by Islamist beliefs.

The deliberate provocations by followers of the Bürgerbewegung pro NRW directed against protesters and Muslims, particularly violent Salafists, increase the threat level.

The **Internet** has become the number-one communication channel of right-wing extremists. Networking and campaigning is facilitated not only by traditional websites, but increasingly by other Internet services, such as social networks, YouTube and Twitter. In particular, reciprocal links among users encourage the growth of "communities" and generate a sense of togetherness, which often results in virtual relationships. Sometimes, virtual contacts are transferred to real life where people then enter into personal relationships, attend meetings or even become founding members of activist groups.

Music with right-wing extremist lyrics continues to play an important role in the whole right-wing extremist scene. Openly or between the lines, the lyrics often transport enemy stereotypes and ideological statements. Music is a particularly good way to capture the interest of young people and tie them to the right-wing extremist scene. There were fewer right-wing extremist concerts than in the preceding year (2012: 82; 2011: 131). The number of active right-wing extremist music groups, however, rose slightly in 2012 compared with 2011 (2012: 182; 2011: 178).

3. Left-wing extremism

In 2012, the left-wing extremist **following** decreased slightly, to 29,400 persons (2011: 31,800). Marxist-Leninist and other revolutionary Marxist groupings have continued to see a significant decline in membership (2012: 22,600 members; 2011: 25,000). The violent left-wing extremist following has not changed compared to the previous year (2012 and 2011: 7,100 persons, including 6,400 autonomists).

There has been a noticeable rise in the left-wing extremist potential for violence. In addition, numerous riots in connection with political demonstrations show a greater willingness by left-wing extremists to use physical violence and take the risk of injuring others. The number of attempted homicides has almost tripled in 2012 (2012: 8; 2011: 3). Attacks against police officers protecting political rallies or other events or against police patrols and police stations are widely accepted among the left-wing extremist scene as long as such attacks do not pose an immediate risk to human health or life. However, small groups of activists are willing to take the risk of causing serious injury to others. On 5 May 2012, for example, unknown individuals threw paving stones at a patrol car which had stopped at traffic lights in Berlin-Kreuzberg, tore open a door of the car and set fire to the back seat. Another incendiary device hit the driver's door and set fire to the exterior of the car.

Although no exceptional incidents or events took place in 2012 which might have provoked anti-militaristic responses, the level of left-wing extremist activity remained the same as in the previous year. In addition to the federal armed forces (Bundeswehr), militant actions were directed against private companies manufacturing military goods or co-operating with the Bundeswehr.

Anti-fascism remained a central element of traditional political action of left-wing extremists in 2012, particularly the violent left wing. Left-wing extremists willing to use violence perceive the behaviour of supposed or actual right-wing extremists as a provocation and consider the use of physical violence against them as legitimate and justifiable. The numerous violent protests against rallies and gatherings of right-wing extremists are evidence of the low threshold for violence in the scene.

The "Revolutionary" 1 May - the day of class struggle of the international labour movement - still holds a prominent position in the event calendar of left-wing

extremists. In 2012, left-wing extremist activists gathered to rally against the economic and financial crisis. Actions concentrated on autonomist strongholds in Berlin and Hamburg, as in previous years. In Berlin, the crowd was slightly bigger than in the previous year, whereas in Hamburg attendance was significantly lower. Overall, the level of violence has fallen, which seems to confirm internal attempts by the left-wing extremist scene to re-politicize their actions.

In addition to confrontational street violence, individual groupings commit **serious, covertly planned attacks**. These acts of violence are carefully prepared and are intended to send a signal. In many cases, letters claiming responsibility are sent to the press or published on the Internet; in these letters, the perpetrators justify their actions with ideological reasoning. To avoid criminal prosecution, the perpetrators use varying names for their actions or do not use any names at all ("no-name violence").

New media play a key role in left-wing extremism. Left-wing extremist groups use the **Internet** both as a communication platform and an open medium for propaganda and political agitation and to mobilize and recruit new followers. In addition, the Internet is used by the anti-fascist hacker community and the cyberguerilla for applications in covert secure domains. Many Internet portals and news blogs serve as information and coordination hubs within the left-wing extremist scene. With reference to setting up a digital infrastructure for their scene to protect their communication channels, they talk about closed forums as "red zones".

Left-wing extremists consider hacking attacks as a special form of anti-fascist struggle; these attacks have gained in importance in recent years. They are targeted mainly against websites of what they consider their political opponents. These attacks often involve defacement, i.e. changing the visual appearance or the content of a website.

Too little attention has been given to **music** as a field of political agitation of left-wing extremism. Music is used both by violence-prone and orthodox left-wing extremists to spread their ideological vision. In addition, music is used to attract people to events or mobilize activists as well as collect money to finance activities.

4. Islamism/Islamist Terrorism

Despite numerous successful search operations, **international Islamist terrorism** poses a serious threat to the international community of states and is still among the greatest dangers jeopardizing Germany's internal security.

The **number of Islamist individuals** has risen to 42,550 (38,080 in 2011). This increase mainly results from the fact that members/adherents believed to be involved in Salafist efforts (4,500) have for the first time been included in the total number of individuals.

The Islamist scene in Germany consists of various structures that form a strong network, the result of which is a threat posed to internal security that can become real any time in the form of attacks of various dimensions and intensity.

The spectrum of Islamist terrorist structures in Germany ranges from networks of Islamists with a propensity to violence and with close links to jihadist organizations in other countries, to very small groups or even single perpetrators who largely operate autonomously, who become radicalized – partly via the Internet at a terrific speed - and who plan their attacks independently.

These single perpetrators are especially challenging for the security agencies, as their attack plannings or preparatory activities are hard to detect in advance – not least because of their living in seclusion.

On 10 February 2012, the Frankfurt/Main Higher Regional Court (Hesse) passed a lifelong prison sentence on the Serbo-Kosovar perpetrator of the attack at Frankfurt airport on 2 March 2011 for double murder and triple attempted murder. The court i.a. established that the accused had committed an attack with an Islamist background against a group of US-American soldiers, which had left two soldiers dead and two others seriously injured, and which had been the first Islamist-motivated terrorist attack in Germany.

On 25 July 2012, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (North Rhine-Westphalia) instituted proceedings against four members of the so-called Düsseldorf Cell who were i.a. accused of membership in the foreign terrorist organization al-Qaeda. The accused had allegedly planned an attack in Germany on behalf of AQ's leadership.

Salafism is the most dynamic Islamist movement at present in Germany and on an international level. The number of followers in Germany keeps rising. Its propaganda is mainly disseminated on the Internet, but also in the course of so-called Islam seminars and campaigns attracting public interest.

The violent riots in North Rhine-Westphalia in early May 2012 that were directed against the public display of Mohammad cartoons during the election campaign tour of the citizens' movement "pro NRW" have shown the potential for violence that can erupt any time depending on the situation. We have to be prepared for new acts of violence by Salafist protagonists any time, especially as soon as Islam-critical and/or Islamophobic positions are publicly promoted in Germany.

On 29 May 2012, the German Minister of the Interior decided to impose a ban on the Salafist and jihadist association "Millatu Ibrahim", and he instituted preliminary proceedings under the law on associations against two other Salafist associations: DawaFFm and DWR ("The True Religion").

The **Internet** is the most important communication and propaganda platform for Islamists and Islamist terrorists. The propaganda disseminated on the Internet, and the 'virtual' networks establishing through it contribute to the fact that activists and

sympathizers of 'global jihad' see themselves as part of one single movement, although their objectives and motivation often differ considerably. Jihadist propaganda is published and disseminated on the Internet in various forms. For instance, there are regular publications of videos, audio files, online magazines and books, statements claiming responsibility for attacks, interviews with leaders or members of jihadist groupings as well as tributes to so-called martyrs.

The **'legalist' Islamist groupings** in Germany that see themselves as lobby groups representing the majority of Muslims living in our country keep trying to influence politics and to stage specific public campaigns in order to enable their adherents in the Federal Republic of Germany to live according to the Sharia. These groupings regard the Sharia as a legal code valid at all times and regulating all areas of life; its application in the long run is considered indispensable. With 31,000 members/adherents, the "Islamist Community Millî Görüş, reg'd assoc." (IGMG) has the largest number of members in this spectrum. Currently, Millî Görüş is experiencing a period of change as regards personnel and structures. Its chairman is making every effort to professionalize the IGMG's work and to give it a more religious profile.

These 'legalist' structures must be distinguished from Islamist organizations striving to replace the existing order in their countries of origin with an Islamist regime, also by using violence. For example, supporters of the Lebanese Hezbollah in Germany raise donations to support the activities of the parent organization.

5. Extremist efforts and other activities by foreigners jeopardizing security (excluding Islamism)

The **number of members and adherents** belonging to the field of non-Islamist extremism by foreigners posing a threat to security has considerably risen in 2012 (28,810 individuals in 2012; 26,410 in 2011), a fact that can be explained by the increasing number of members belonging to nationalist groups of foreigners (10,840 in 2012; 7,840 in 2011).

The activities carried out by these organizations are mainly influenced by current political events and developments in their respective countries of origin.

Supporters of the **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)**, which is banned in Germany, organised various large-scale events, rallies and demonstrations, in particular via the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany (reg'd assoc.; YEK-KOM), for propaganda purposes but also for recruiting new adherents.

In the course of 2012, the armed conflict in the Turkish-Iraqi border region between PKK guerilla units, the so-called People's Defence Forces (HPG), and the Turkish military intensified. As a result, Europe saw considerable tensions between Kurds living here and being close to PKK and nationalist Turks. In this context, adherents of

the PKK's youth organization Komalên Ciwan organised sit-ins and violent acts in Germany that attracted considerable public interest and media attention. For instance, adherents of the youth organization i.a. occupied the TV station Rhein-Neckar-Fernsehen in Mannheim (Baden-Württemberg) on 13 April 2012 and a tourist boat in Cologne (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 15 April 2012.

Supporters of **Turkish left-wing extremist organizations** propagate the armed struggle in their home country, and in 2012, they once more claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Turkey. In Germany, however, they use hardly any violence. Their agitation mainly focuses on incidents in Turkey, but they also voice their opinion on events in the Federal Republic of Germany and act like a lobby advocating the migrants' and workers' interests.

Supporters of the Turkish **nationalist Ülkücü movement** (suspicious case), also publicly known as Grey Wolves, especially attracted attention during demonstrations, which occasionally sparked off heavy riots between nationalist Turks and Kurds.

Separatist Asian Organizations such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and groupings from the Sikh religious community seek to gain independence from the state of Sri Lanka or India. Their declared aim is to set up a Tamil state "Tamil Eelam" which is independent of the state of Sri Lanka and which is envisaged to span the northern and eastern part of the island, the areas which are mainly populated by Tamils. In the 2012 reporting period, they basically tried to attract public attention to their cause staging events and demonstrations. In Germany, they mainly concentrated on propaganda activities to achieve that aim.

6. Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities

The Federal Republic of Germany is a very attractive target for foreign intelligence services due to its geopolitical situation, the role it plays within the EU and NATO, and the fact that numerous manufacturers of cutting-edge technology are based here. Germany's open and pluralistic society makes it easy for them to gather information.

Many intelligence services do not only fulfil tasks regulated by law, but they are also under political control. Their **information-gathering priorities** are oriented on current political requirements or economic priorities set in their home countries. The foreign intelligence services' activities range from information-gathering activities in the fields of politics, trade and industry, the military, and science and technology to spying on and infiltrating organizations and individuals in Germany that are opposed to the governments in their countries of origin.

The protagonists currently engaged in espionage activities against Germany are the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, as well as countries in the Middle East.

The number of intelligence staff assigned to the official or semi-official missions of other countries in Germany vary. In these missions, they run offices known as **legal residencies**. The term refers to bases used by foreign intelligence services in their host countries under cover of one of their own countries' official (e.g. embassy, consulate-general) or semi-official (e.g. press agency, airline) missions.

Additionally, these intelligence services carry out operations in which their legal residencies are not involved. In their own countries, for example, they use numerous ways to gather information through foreigners. Moreover, intelligence officers from the services' headquarters travel to third countries for reconnaissance and meeting purposes in the framework of their operational activities, taking advantage of the freedom of travel within the Schengen area. In some cases, agents do not meet their handling officers in Germany, but in other European countries. In addition, "illegals" are used, i.e. intelligence officers who are infiltrated into their target countries with false identities, where they are assigned long-term espionage missions or temporarily pursue particular intelligence activities as "travelling illegals". Once their false identities have been regularized, they can be given long-term assignments and gain a vast variety of accesses.

In addition to espionage using human sources, **technical information gathering** has become increasingly important in recent years. Especially "electronic attacks" have become an important information-gathering method. The term refers to targeted measures using IT infra-structures and directed against such infra-structures with the measures aimed at gathering information or at damaging or sabotaging these systems.

In many cases, the originators of "electronic attacks" cannot be clearly identified. However, foreign intelligence services also use such technologies. In these cases, counter-espionage will take over.

Information that can be gathered from public authorities in this way is of particular interest to foreign intelligence services. The large number of "electronic attacks" with a suspected intelligence background illustrate how important this method of information gathering is.

In addition, some countries try to procure **technologies for weapons of mass destruction**. They try to circumvent controls in the exporting countries by having goods delivered via third countries or by procuring "dual use" goods². The term **proliferation** refers to spreading nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction, and/or products used for their production and their corresponding carriers (e.g. missiles, drones), including the required expertise.

²

Products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

The Federal Republic of Germany being one of the leading industrialized nations, it is an important target for proliferation-relevant procurement activities. Particularly the activities of Iran and North Korea are causes for concern.

Germany's role in technology and research whets the appetite of other countries. These countries and their intelligence services try to gather information and expertise in manifold ways in order to achieve a competitive advantage for their own economies, and to catch up with Germany in the field of technology as fast as possible.

The **protection against industrial espionage** and the aim to protect German expertise in order to have a competitive advantage is of major importance to the Federal Government. Therefore, the domestic intelligence services of the Federation and the federal states deem it their duty to counter these threats, also pre-emptively.

This is where **information and counselling offered by the BfV** come into play. They are to help entrepreneurs assess whether certain abstract threats might apply for their businesses, and to help them recognize risk factors they did not pay attention to before. Ultimately, they are to help businesses to establish their own security concepts.

7. The Scientology Organization (SO)

Since 2008, a decline in the number of members of the Scientology Organization (SO) has been determined. The domestic intelligence services estimate that the SO had between 3,500 and 4,500 members in 2012 (2008: between 5,000 and 6,000).

The organization, which presents itself as an apolitical religious community, rejects the democratic legal system. Its long-term goal is to have exclusive authority over a social order in which basic human rights are limited or non-existent. The SO hopes to achieve this ultimate political aim with a long-term strategy of expansion. For example, it continues to use its "ideal org" campaign to try to expand its German branches and strengthen its political influence. While its Berlin centre was designated an "ideal org" in 2008, Hamburg org achieved this status in 2012.

In addition to Berlin and Hamburg, the most important regions for the SO, in terms of membership and activities, are the federal states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. Significant numbers of members can be found in Hesse, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Despite the organization's continued attempts to recruit new members through advertising activities, its public activities declined in 2012.