



Federal Ministry
of the Interior

2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Facts and Trends



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Politically motivated crime¹

In 2013, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 31,645 politically motivated crimes (2012: 27,440). This figure includes 13,105 (41.4%) propaganda offences (2012: 13,524 offences, or 49.3%). A further 2,848 offences (9.0%) are categorized as politically motivated violent crimes (2012: 2,464, or 9.0%). A total of 22,129 (69.9%) of the politically motivated crimes were found to have an extremist background (2012: 21,265, or 77.5%), of which 537 (2012: 284) could not be assigned to any specific category.

Two aspects are worthy of note:

- The number of violent crimes with a xenophobic background has again risen.
- There has been a huge increase in the number of left-wing extremist violent crimes.

More specifically:

In the area of **right-wing politically motivated crime**, 16,557 (2012: 17,134) criminal offences were recorded as having an extremist background, including 801 (2012: 802) violent crimes. The number of right-wing politically motivated crimes thus dropped by 3.4%, while the number of violent crimes levelled off. Violent crimes made up 4.8% of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2012: 4.7%). Of all the crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 80.7% (2012: 81.4%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (11,639; 2012: 12,219) or incitement to hatred (1,727; 2012: 1,733).

In total, 473 violent crimes had a xenophobic background (2012: 393), showing an increase for the third year in succession and the highest incidence since 2006 (484). Three out of the four attempted homicides had a xenophobic background. A total of 146 violent crimes (2012: 189) were committed against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, a further 52 (2012: 66) against other political opponents.

In 2013, 8,673 criminal offences were classified as **left-wing politically motivated crimes** (2012: 6,191), including 1,659 (2012: 1,291) violent crimes. In this area 4,491 offences were classified as having a left-wing extre-

1 The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

mist background (2012: 3,229), including 1,110 violent crimes (2012: 876). The number of left-wing politically motivated crimes thus came close to the highest level recorded to date (2011) since the category of “politically motivated crime” was introduced in 2001. It also means that left-wing extremist motivated crimes increased by 39.1% and violent crimes by 26.7%. Of these left-wing extremist motivated crimes, 632 (2012: 471) were committed against the police or security authorities, 566 (2012: 405) against actual or supposed right-wing extremists, and 151 violent crimes (2012: 32) were categorized as part of the “Campaign against Restructuring”.²

In the area of **politically motivated crime by foreigners**, 544 (2012: 618) crimes had an extremist background, including 76 (2012: 117) violent crimes. The number of politically motivated crimes by foreigners with an extremist background thus dropped by 12.0%, that of violent crimes in this area by 35%.

² Since the recorded incidents can be assessed from various perspectives in the context of a multidimensional analysis, violent crimes can be assigned to various categories.

Right-wing extremism

As in previous years, the number of right-wing extremist sympathizers fell slightly, to 21,700 persons at the end of 2013 after subtracting multiple memberships. The number of right-wing extremists willing to use violence remain unchanged at 9,600. More than one-quarter of all right-wing extremists are neo-Nazis, although the size of the neo-Nazi scene shrank slightly for the first time in years, to about 5,800 persons. The largest segment of sympathizers, at about 30%, is made up of subcultural right-wing extremists (2013: 7,400), while the proportion of skinheads continues to shrink.

Right-wing extremist following¹		
	2012	2013
Subcultural right-wing extremists	7,500	7,400
Neo-Nazis²	6,000	5,800
In parties	7,150	7,000
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)	6,000	5,500
DIE RECHTE (The Right)	150	500
Bürgerbewegung pro NRW (pro NRW, Civic movement for North Rhine-Westphalia)	1,000	1,000
Other right-wing extremist organizations	2,500	2,500
Total	23,150	22,700
after subtracting multiple memberships³	22,150	21,700
of which right-wing extremists willing to use violence	9,600	9,600

¹ Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.
² After subtracting multiple memberships within the neo-Nazi milieu.
³ Instances of multiple membership of political parties and other right-wing extremist organizations were subtracted from the overall figures.

As in previous years, nearly half of all right-wing extremists are **willing to use violence**. The **militant nature** of the milieu is apparent from the unchanged high level of right-wing extremist acts of violence generated by incitement against various groups such as political opponents and foreigners. The potential for violence among right-wing extremists is also apparent from their attraction to weapons. Again in 2013, police searches repeatedly found functioning weapons.

Warning of the threat of “race extinction”, violent extremists always regard their actions as self-defence against a supposedly overpowering enemy, in a situation in which legal methods seem to them insufficient. Inherent in this apocalyptic reasoning, which creates the setting for desperate acts, is the figure of the outnumbered militant.

Within a milieu made up of persons espousing irrational arguments, violent fantasies and apocalyptic images, a central task in protecting the Constitution is to identify those who may be about to take to heart the motto of the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU, National Socialist Underground): “deeds not words”.

Monitoring violent right-wing extremism continues to be a priority of the federal and state offices for the protection of the Constitution. This includes above all quickly forwarding relevant information to the investigating authorities. Again in 2013, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution was working on several threat situations with indications of possible right-wing terrorist activity. Close cooperation between the offices for the protection of the Constitution and the police was instrumental in the Federal Public Prosecutor’s decision to initiate several investigations on suspicion of forming a terrorist organization (Section 129a of the Criminal Code).

In most cases, right-wing extremist violence is unplanned. While such spontaneous violence usually tends to be carried out by subcultural right-wing extremists without strong ties to the milieu, planned and targeted right-wing extremist criminal and violent offences tend to be the work of members of the neo-Nazi spectrum.

The long-term shift away from fixed organizations to **informal forms of cooperation and coordination** continued in 2013. On the other hand,

bans of neo-Nazi groups known as *Kameradschaften* led more recently to discussions of appropriate models of organization and the founding of new right-wing extremist political parties.

For example, activists from banned **neo-Nazi organizations** in North Rhine-Westphalia dominate that state's branch of the party founded in May 2012 by neo-Nazi Christian Worch, **DIE RECHTE** (The Right). Most of its roughly 500 members come from the neo-Nazi spectrum. The party openly describes its participation in the democratic decision-making process and in elections as the means to an end: as a way to preserve and develop structures for its opposition to democracy. This tactic at least limits the effectiveness of bans intended to dismantle such structures. Other neo-Nazi organizations may also resort to forming political parties in future. Neo-Nazis in southern Germany paid close attention to the founding of a small, new right-wing extremist party, **Der III. Weg** (The Third Way), in September 2013.

Relations between the neo-Nazi scene and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) remain mixed. Although the largest share of the neo-Nazi scene cooperates with and supports the NPD, tensions have increased between the party and neo-Nazis in certain regions such as Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia.

The **NPD** has been losing members for years, and this trend continued in 2013. The NPD had 5,500 members as of December 2013. Following its disappointing results in the Bundestag elections, financial difficulties and a petition to ban the party before the Federal Constitutional Court, in late 2013 the NPD also faced leadership issues: Its unpopular chairman, Holger Apfel, who had struggled to maintain his "serious radicality", stepped down under unclear circumstances at the end of the year. As his successor, the party executive chose Udo Pastörs, who is known for his radical statements and has long advocated a close alliance between the party and neo-Nazis, in line with the so-called "Volksfront" strategy. But Pastörs' authority was undermined already on 18 January 2014 at the nominating convention for the elections to the European Parliament, when he lost out to the veteran party leader Udo Voigt in the battle for first place on the list of candidates.

There continue to be no doubts about the party's fundamental ideological and strategic orientation and its opposition to the Federal Republic of Germany's system of liberal democracy.

The major focus of activity of the **Bürgerbewegung pro NRW** (Popular movement for North Rhine-Westphalia) is fighting the supposed threat that Germany or even Europe will be dominated by Muslims. Since spring 2013, however, the party has increasingly targeted asylum seekers and immigrants of all kinds, regardless of their religious affiliation, with its "popular initiative against asylum abuse" accompanied by a series of rallies held at "hotspots of asylum abuse" (mainly dormitories for asylum seekers) in 21 German cities. The party subsequently focused primarily on Sinti and Roma.

Threats to domestic security arise in particular from **confrontations between extremists**: right-wing against left-wing, right-wing against Islamist extremists. Right-wing and left-wing extremist campaigns to "out" their opponents on the Internet and in the real world create a climate of latent violence. Even if those doing the "outing" do not always intend the direct use of violence, their actions give others who may be willing to use violence detailed information about their targets. At demonstrations, often the only way to prevent direct violent confrontations is by having a large police presence.

In addition to their typical hostility towards foreigners, Jews, political opponents, representatives of the state (police officers, judges, public prosecutors), "anti-social elements" and anyone who somehow fails to fit in, **right-wing extremists also target journalists**. Deriding them as lackeys of the media establishment, right-wing extremists seek to hinder journalists from doing their jobs. Sometimes this goes beyond verbal attacks: For example, at a demonstration in Bad Nenndorf, Lower Saxony, in August 2013, a journalist was hit over the head with a flagstaff. Right-wing extremists also use "outing" to create an atmosphere of threat, publishing their victims' addresses on the Internet and thus making them targets of anyone willing to use violence. Another kind of threat comes from right-wing extremists who manage to acquire a press pass and pose as journalists in order to get past police barricades and take photos of counter-demonstrators.

Although right-wing extremism is not deeply rooted everywhere in Germany, it has clearly spread in a few regions. In this situation, German right-wing extremists are watching **developments in other countries**: the success of parliamentary oriented right-wing extremists and populists as well as militant movements such as the cultural revolutionary Casa Pound in Italy and especially Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) in Greece.

The neo-Nazi Freies Netz Süd (FNS, Free Net South) views the success of Greek right-wing extremists as “a signal to all nationalist groups”, showing that “the sleeping masses can still be aroused when the conditions are right”. The different groups have therefore sought to make contact, for example when German right-wing extremists travelled to Athens in February 2013 at the invitation of their “comrades” there. The murder of an anti-fascist artist by a Golden Dawn sympathizer failed to lessen the admiration of the German right-wing extremists, nor did a police investigation of the militant organization’s functionaries on suspicion of forming a criminal organization. On the contrary, German neo-Nazis organized events to show their solidarity, including a rally in front of the Greek consulate in Munich with the slogan “United in the struggle for a free Europe of fatherlands ... side by side”.

At times, right-wing extremists try to inject their **ideology into apparently harmless contexts**: They work on behalf of socially and politically relevant issues without revealing their political background, or doing so only later. This applies to environmental and animal rights issues, to campaigns against child abuse and to the practical solidarity when helping victims of flooding in some regions of Germany.

In 2013, **asylum policy** was an especially important issue. Right-wing extremists addressed this issue from the perspective of their racist and xenophobic agenda. At sites of existing or planned housing for asylum seekers, they tried without ceasing to radicalize protests by other groups and exploit them for their own purposes, in particular by organizing or infiltrating grassroots campaigns. By hiding their role in such campaigns, right-wing extremists hoped to attract more supporters than their usual clientele, and thanks to the large numbers of demonstrators, they were sometimes successful. Political parties such as the NPD used openly

right-wing extremist initiatives to seek recognition as an alternative for voters. In particular, by holding rallies in the immediate vicinity of planned or existing housing for asylum seekers, parties in these electoral districts hoped to significantly improve their results in upcoming elections. Similar activities can be expected ahead of the elections in 2014.

Even if these protests against asylum seekers are not explicitly violent, they can easily spin out of control and incite individuals or small groups to violent action. For example, there were 58 criminal attacks on housing for asylum seekers in 2013, more than twice the number in 2012 (24).

Right-wing extremists try to disseminate their ideology using **demonstrations and concerts**. The NPD mobilized a significant number of participants at 95 demonstrations (2012: 116), while neo-Nazis held 85 demonstrations (2012:95). The party DIE RECHTE held 31 mostly smaller demonstrations, while pro NRW held 30.

Music with right-wing extremist lyrics continues to play an important role, serving in particular to recruit new supporters, strengthen identification with the milieu and mobilize for public demonstrations. The number of right-wing extremist concerts fell slightly in 2013 to 78, compared to 82 in 2012. Although fewer concerts by artists popular with the scene were held at right-wing extremist party rallies (46, down from 49 the previous year), the number of smaller “musical evenings” significantly increased, from 17 in 2012 to 47 in 2013.

Left-wing extremism

The number of active left-wing extremists fell slightly to 27,700 in 2013. This is primarily due to the drop in membership of Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist and other revolutionary Marxist groups (2013: 21,600 members), as well as due to the slight decrease in the number of violent left-wing extremists (2013: 6,900).

Left-wing extremist following ¹		
	2012	2013
Violent left-wing extremists,	7,100	6,900
of which:		
Autonomists	6,400	6,100
Anarchists	700	800
Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists²	22,600	21,600
Total	29,700	28,500
After deducting multiple memberships³	29,400	27,700
¹ Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off. ² The figure also includes those active in openly extremist groups within DIE LINKE (The Left). ³ Multiple membership of political parties and other groups was deducted from the overall number of supporters and active members.		

Although the number of violent left-wing extremists and attempted homicides (2013: 3; 2012: 8) dropped, the **potential for** left-wing extremist **violence** rose in comparison to previous years. This was manifested in a significant increase in the number of violent crimes recorded. It is also apparent that the threshold for violence is becoming ever lower, that is when it comes to demonstrators using violence both against police officers and police facilities, as well as against their political opponents (in particular actual or supposed right-wing extremists). Such violent acts are regarded as legitimate and are largely accepted within the left-wing extremist spectrum, as long as they do not directly endanger human life. There is still consensus among the autonomous scene that targeted at-

tacks with the intent to kill should be rejected; serious injuries that may lead to death are accepted, though.

The aim of left-wing extremist violence is to send a signal – including to others in the scene, who are to be encouraged to follow suit. Left-wing extremists also instigate violence during demonstrations in the hope that others, often the otherwise non-political, will take up and intensify the violence.

The aim of such militancy is to reinforce political demands and boost left-wing extremist campaigns. This again and again gives rise to debates in the left-wing extremist scene around how far violence can go so that it is still “acceptable” and to what extent it can be endorsed or at least still tolerated by the non-militant. Ultimately, the scene aims to consolidate various approaches and strategies, ranging from demonstrations and blockades to militant activities. The main perpetrators of left-wing extremist violence are autonomists, who regard the collective expression of mass militancy as a meaningful experience. Autonomists mean to combine various forms of action: “Sabotage and sit-ins, mass militancy and civil disobedience, subversion and communication guerrilla”.

Autonomist groups – most of which have no name or keep changing their name – carried out numerous property-related attacks, including during big events and in the context of their campaigns. Criminal and violent offences – thinly veiled as “mass militancy” – were also committed during demonstrations and rallies, often in the form of confrontations with the police.

A few examples:

- Following the “Revolutionary 1st May Demonstration” in Berlin several arson attacks were carried out and property was damaged – described as “militant addenda” by the groups involved. On 2 May 2013, for instance, unknown persons set fire to a cable duct and a junction box, causing considerable disruption to the suburban railway system in the western part of Berlin and the mainline route between Berlin and Magdeburg for several hours.
- An attack was carried out in the context of the “War Starts Here. Campaign Against War Becoming Normality” that caused a great

deal of damage to property: Shortly after an “antimilitaristic” camp was organized against the Combat Training Centre near Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt in July 2013, unknown perpetrators set fire to numerous Bundeswehr vehicles at the Elbe-Havel Barracks in Havelberg, Saxony-Anhalt around 100 km south-west of the camp. The attacks caused damage totalling around €10m.

- On 21 December 2013 some 7,300 people, including up to 4,000 violent left-wing extremists, were mobilized to take part in the “Flora is Still Incompatible” campaign in Hamburg by cleverly linking it to topical issues such as urban renewal and refugee policy. The ensuing clashes were among the most serious that had occurred since the 1980s. The situation escalated right at the start after the police were massively attacked. More than 160 police officers were injured, one of them seriously. The police dissolved the demonstration, after which further property was damaged in several districts of Hamburg.

Despite the at times excessive level of violence among left-wing extremists, no terrorist dimension is currently discernible. However, terrorist endeavours must also in principle be considered possible in the left-wing extremist scene.

Left-wing extremists have for years been focusing their activities on the following **areas**: “antirepression”, “antimilitarism”, “antifascism”, “antigentrification” (“the fight for the city”), “antiracism” and “internationalism”. In addition, left-wing extremists attempt to get involved in social protest movements whose supporters they aim to use for their own purposes, namely to over-come the system. The ideological basis for these activities remains their rejection of capitalism, which left-wing extremists equate with our social and economic order, whereby they all concur that it is not capitalism that is in crisis, but that capitalism itself is the crisis, the catalyst for wars, racism, natural disasters, social inequality and the destruction of living spaces.

Marxist-Leninists currently have no effective, independent organizations. The German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP), which is set to steer an even more radical orthodox-communist

course under the new chairman, and Maoist groups remain on the margins even of the left-wing extremist spectrum. Others, like the Trotskyist groups, attempt to gain and exert an influence on DIE LINKE (The Left) (a policy known as “entrism”).

Islamism/Islamist Terrorism

The Islamist following in Germany has grown from 42,550 (in 2012) to 43,190 members. This growth is due to the continuous increase in the number of followers of the Salafist movement in Germany in particular.

Islamist Following¹		
Organisations²	2012	2013
"Al-Qaeda" and affiliated terrorist organisations	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Kurdish Islamist networks / "Ansar al-Islam" (AAI)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
"Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" (IMU)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Salafist Movements	4,500	5,500
"Hezbollah"	950	950
"Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah" (HAMAS)	300	300
" North Caucasus Separatist Movement" (NKSB - Nordkau-kasische Separatisten-bewegung)	500	250
"Turkish Hezbollah" (TH)	350	350
"Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan" (HIA)	200	200
"Hizb ut-Tahrir" (HuT)	300	300
"Muslim Brotherhood" (MB)	1,300	1,300
"Tablighi Jama'at" (TJ)	700	700
"Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V." (IZH)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
"Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V." (IGMG)	31,000	31,000
Other³	2,450	2,340
Total number	42,550	43,190

1 The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded.
2 The list includes - in a systematic order - terrorist organisations and those which refrain from violence.
3 Other organisations whose membership/following is relevant to the pool of Islamists.

The various forms of Islamism differ both in their approach (regional or global) and their means (legalistic, violence-oriented or terrorist). What all of them have in common is the abuse of religion to political ends.

Germany continues to be one of the target countries of **Islamist terrorism**. This is demonstrated by numerous legal proceedings, including the trial against four presumed al-Qaeda members, who are strongly suspected of having planned, directly on behalf of AQ's leadership, a terrorist attack in Germany, as well as the pending trial because of a planned attack on a right-wing extremist and the thwarted attack on the central station in Bonn in December 2012.

In 2013, the civil war in Syria was the focus of Islamist propaganda. The developments in this country have been followed closely by the whole "jihadist" scene. There are two reasons for that: the violent nature of the conflict which is blamed on the other conflicting parties, and the opportunity to gain combat experience.

In Germany (and throughout Europe), the strong emotionalisation is accompanied by two trends: by an enormous **propaganda effort** in support of (jihadist) Islamist forces on the one hand and by a **wave of departures** of Islamists for Syria on the other hand. For many Islamists from Europe, travels to a theatre of jihad as well as the readiness to join armed combat, which may result in sacrificing one's life ("cult of martyrs"), are the natural consequence of their inner attitude.

Islamist propaganda for Syria is intended to persuade Muslims living in Germany to make donations of money and goods in order to help "needy brothers and sisters" in Syria and to provide moral and logistic support, maybe even support in terms of finances and human resources, to the resistance against the Syrian regime. This propaganda is exclusively aimed at supporting the Sunnis. This focus reflects the denominational dimension of the conflict in Syria also for Germany. So-called charity events in and around mostly Salafist-oriented mosques, which are held at regular intervals throughout Germany, serve, such as the Internet (mainly via video messages), as platforms for propaganda. Apart from key figures of the Salafist scene, a large number of activists are engaged in that field, carrying propaganda to various target groups via social networks. Like Islamist agitation in general, also Islamist propaganda for Syria is characterised by

emotionalisation and narratives which highlight historical events: Sobbing, tears and outbursts of rage usually accompany the speeches. Piteous or shocking pictures (e.g. videos) as well as religious/mythological narratives on "al-Sham" (the historical "Greater Syria") as the "location for the final battle before the Day of Judgement" are used to "legitimise" resistance. Such images are capable of recruiting volunteers for violent combat against Assad's regime. Salafist propagandists with formerly different views work together in this context.

As of early 2014, more than 270³ German or German-based Islamists who had departed for Syria to join fightings or to support resistance against the Syrian regime in any other way were known to the security agencies – a trend whose end is not yet in sight. Some of the Islamists who had left Germany have already returned. Returnees who underwent terrorist training in Syria or in the region or who took actively part in fightings pose a special security risk. Returnees may resort to activities endangering security and individuals who stay in the conflict area may pose a threat to German or foreign interests. So lone actors or individuals affiliated with a jihadist group in Syria might engage in attack plannings after their return to Germany. Furthermore, returnees may serve as an example for other – especially young – Muslims, who may be motivated to join jihad in Syria.

The **complexity of Islamist terrorist structures** has further increased in recent years. Islamist terrorism has been both globalised and individualised: Besides "al-Qaeda" itself and associated regional groups, there are various networks which are affiliated with the terrorist organisation. But mainly the lone actors – who have often radicalised themselves by Internet publications – are those who make it hard for the security agencies to identify preparatory action at an early stage.

"Individual jihad" has gained increasing importance. The number of calls to wage an "open source jihad", i.e. terrorist attacks by lone actors independent from any organisation and living on site, is still large. Such attacks, including the assassinations carried out by Arid Uka in Frankfurt on the Main, the shootings by Mohammad Merah in France, the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, and the killing of a British soldier in London, show the serious threat posed by this form of combat. The English-

3 As of mid-May 2014, there was intelligence on more than 320 individuals.

language online magazine "Inspire" published by "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) called the bomb attack against the Boston Marathon "a demonstration of the effectiveness of individual jihad". This *modus operandi* is referred to by jihadist strategists as the most promising strategy against the West with its more advanced technology. It meets with a continuous positive response in jihadist forums. In March 2013, for example, the "Inspire" magazine called upon its readers to take action in the form of "thousands of little pinpricks".

Salafism continues to be the currently most dynamic Islamist movement in Germany as well as throughout the world. Also in 2013, there was an increase in the number of its adherents in Germany: In late 2013, 5,500 individuals were assessed to be affiliated with Salafist circles (in 2012: 4,500). A further increase in the number of Salafist followers must be also expected for 2014. Salafism is a particularly radical form of Islamism, which claims to be exclusively based on the principles of the Koran and the example of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first three generations of Muslims. The Salafists' aim is the total orientation of state, society and personal life to these norms, which are presented as being "God's will". A demonstration of this view is the statement of a convicted Salafist, who exclaimed in January 2014 before the Regional Court in Bonn: "Allah is the only one who is entitled to make decisions, not the people." After he had held a copy of the Koran into the air and called the Koran his law, he threw pages of a copy of the German Basic Law on the ground, shouting: "...and this is the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany."

Salafists spread their ideology by making extensive propaganda, which they euphemistically describe as "da'wah" (Arabic for proselytising). Salafist indoctrination is so successful because it appeals to essential social needs of people seeking orientation, apart from its ideological superstructure. Salafism reaches the broad public mainly via German-language websites and short videos on the Internet. In addition, Salafists organise events throughout Germany (e.g. rallies, fund-raising campaigns, "seminars on Islam", and information stands).

By decrees dated 25 February 2013, the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the Salafist proselytising network "**DawaFFM**", the "Internation-

aler Jugendverein - Dar al Schabab e.V." as its affiliated organisation, as well as the association "Islamische Audios" (aka "DawaTeam Islamische Audios"). The bans were implemented on 13 March 2013.⁴

Islamists have recognised the **potential for mobilisation and recruitment in prisons**. In Germany, various projects with their own web presence try to get support for imprisoned Islamists, eventually promoting jihadist Salafism. In social networks, the contributions ask for solidarity and material support. The publication of prisoner letters is designed to promote the "heroic status" of the detainees. Because the latter, due to their situation, are often particularly susceptible to ideologies which promise them stability and support, imprisoned Islamists are particularly prone to further radicalisation during their imprisonment. Imprisoned Islamists may also be able to radicalise other prisoners.

In anti-imperialist left-wing extremist circles and among neo-Nazis, there is sometimes open appreciation and approval of the Islamists' uncompromising struggle against the West, especially the US and Israel. Neo-Nazis often respond approvingly to the jihadists' anti-Semitic hatred.

Islamists, on the other hand, respond to right-wing extremist provocations with a considerable extent of militancy, if they feel Prophet Muhammad insulted. This was demonstrated by the presumed attack plans against the chair-man of the party "Bürgerbewegung pro NRW" in March 2013. Anti-Islam statements of right-wing extremist or right-wing populist groups give them an, in their view legitimate, reason to mount violent activities. Salafists regard such statements and state protection for such demonstrations as an attack on Islam, thus justifying their "struggle/jihad" in Germany.

The Islamist organisations **HAMAS and "Hezbollah"**, whose aim is to destroy the Jewish state of Israel, are focused on their home regions and principally make use of terrorist violence there. Europe is rather considered a sanctuary, for example to raise funds. Financial and logistical support from Germany, as identified, promotes the armed struggle against Israel. Knowing that the surviving dependants of "martyrs" will get certain financial and social support, is extra motivation for militants to sacrifice their lives in combating Israel. On 8 April 2014, the Federal Minis-

4 "DawaFFM" and its affiliated organisation "Internationaler Jugendverein – Dar al Schabab e.V." appealed against these bans to the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG). By its decision dated 14 May 2014, the BVerwG confirmed the legitimacy of the bans.

ter of the Interior banned the association "Waisenkinderprojekt Libanon e.V." (WKP). The funds raised by WKP in Germany had been transferred to the "Shahid Foundation" ("Martyrs Foundation") based in Lebanon, in the period between 2007 and mid-2013 a total amount of €3,296,888, for example. The "Shahid Foundation" is a "charity", which cares for orphans or dependants of killed Hezbollah combatants. As a charitable structure, it is an integral part of Hezbollah and backs up the latter's terrorist activities directed against Israel.

Legalistic groups use political means in order to ensure that their members can lead a life in conformity with Islamic rules in Germany, as they see it. The group with the largest membership (31,000) within this spectrum is the "**Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V.**" (IGMG), which is currently in a phase of structural change, also with regard to personnel. The chairman of IGMG continues to work towards more professionalism in IGMG's activities and seeks to adopt a much more religious organisational profile.

Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamism)

With 28,810 members in 2013, the following from the field of non-Islamist organisations of foreigners posing a threat to security resp. extremist organisations of foreigners in Germany was the same as in the previous year. The activities of these groupings are mainly influenced by political developments and events in the respective countries of origin. Thus, they are primarily aimed at a radical change of the political conditions in the country of origin. Most of these groupings consider Germany a safe haven. From here, they can support the organisations in their home countries by propagandist, but particularly by material and financial means, too.

Following of extremist organisations of foreigners ^{1,2} (excluding Islamism)		
	2012	2013
Left-wing extremists	17,970	16,970
including:		
"Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK)	13,000	13,000
"Revolutionary People's Liberation Party - Front" (DHKP-C)	650	650
"Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists" (TKP/ML)	1,300	1,300
"Marxist-Leninist Communist Party" (MLKP)	600	600
"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE)	1,000	
Others	1,420	1,420
Separatists ³		1,790
including:		
"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE)		1,000
Extremist Sikhs		790 ⁴
Extreme Nationalists	10,840	10,050
Total number	28,810	28,810

¹ Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded.
² Figures also include members / sympathisers of the groups which have been banned.
³ New systematic representation of the following from 2013 onwards.
⁴ In the previous years listed under the category of extreme nationalists.

The "Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK) continues to pursue its objective of a political and cultural autonomy of the Kurds in their settlement areas by maintaining the national borders. The exploratory talks between the Turkish government and the PKK leadership which had started in December 2012 were "officially" confirmed by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by his call for peace in March 2013. The process, which is accompanied by great mistrust and conditions which are hard to fulfil on both sides, has come to a standstill in the meantime.

The PKK, which is still highly capable of mobilising its supporters – the organisation, which encompasses approx. 13,000 adherents and which has been banned from an activity in Germany, for example mobilized just under 25,000 individuals to participate in the Kurdish cultural festival in Dortmund in 2013 – has committed its Germany-based adherents to refrain from militant actions: A tendency which might again come to nothing if the peace negotiations fail. Nevertheless, violence continues to be a strategic element for the PKK, which the organisation decides on depending on the political situation.

This is also proven by the continuous recruitment of fighters – also in Germany - for the armed struggle in Turkey. Another proof are the combat actions in Syria, also involving the military participation of the local PKK branch ("Democratic Union Party" – PYD). The PKK exploits in particular the fighting in Syria for propagandist purposes. Although, in its statutes, the PYD accepts the "People's Congress of Kurdistan" (KONGRA GEL) as the supreme legislative power of the Kurdish people, attempts are being made to present it as an independent organisation.

This is part of the PKK's tactics to free itself of the image of a banned organisation and to pretend to establish legal structures. These tactics also include attempts to question the ban placed on its activities by means of political initiatives and targeted lobbying.

In 2013, the "Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front" (DHKP-C), which has been banned in Germany, continued its terrorist offensive against institutions of the state and the economy started in Turkey in mid 2012. A suicide attacker, who had been politically active in Germany for

several years before, committed a bomb attack against the US embassy in Ankara.

In Germany, the DHKP-C also operates via its cover organisation "Anatolian Federation". Especially by means of an anti-racism campaign, in the framework of which it brings serious accusations against the state, it tries to gain acceptance among migrants. Although it considers Europe a safe haven and does not carry out any militant activities there, it is still obvious that the overall organisation backs the terrorist attacks of its armed branch, for example by the death cult in the context of the obligatory commemoration of the so-called martyrs.

In 2013, too, numerous preliminary and criminal proceedings were conducted against DHKP-C functionaries and activists.

The Turkish nationalist "Ülkücü" movement is ideologically rooted in exaggerated nationalism, linked with an overstated image of its own ethnicity. The ideology is characterized by very distinct, often also racist, enemy concepts of ethnic minorities in Turkey. These minorities include Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Jews. The latent readiness to use violence resulting from this attitude falls on fertile ground particularly among the adherents of the "Ülkücü" youth movement who network on the Internet. The militant conflict with the "enemy" is also illustrated by videos and photographs spread on the Internet. In June 2013, the police searched approx. 20 premises of members of the "Ülkücü" movement in three German federal states. In the framework of this search two live arms with ammunition, blank-firing guns, batons, electric stun guns and Samurai swords were seized.

In 2013, the separatist South-Asian organisations in Germany continued to behave rather inconspicuously and were preoccupied with the establishment of organisational structures.

As regards the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE), it seems that the two wings of the organisation have approached each other. It remains to be seen whether this development will be accompanied by a change of strategic premises – i.e. by a resumption of the armed struggle or, just to

the contrary, by peaceful, consensus-oriented agitation – and whether it will possibly lead to joining forces in a united organisation.

Extremist Sikh organisations in Germany will continue to support their parent organisations' separatist endeavours by propagandist means in future, too.

The importance of the Internet for extremist activities

The Internet guarantees rapid dissemination and enormous reach coupled with extensive creative freedom. Since material can be published anonymously, extremist opinions are expressed openly and unashamedly.

In 2013 the importance of the Internet was particularly evident in regard to Islamist propaganda about Syria. The glorification of units fighting in the conflict zones was linked to the direct call to join the common struggle. The Islamists' propagandistic agitation laid one of the foundations for the wave of "jihadists" travelling to the combat zone.

As regards **right-wing extremism**, a campaign against asylum-seekers that received massive support primarily via the Internet is worthy of note. A prominent example of how right-wing extremists are exerting an influence on the "asylum debate" is the "Citizens' Movement Marzahn-Hellersdorf", which predominantly operates via the Internet, and the numerous comments clearly written using right-wing extremist diction that are posted by alleged residents on its Facebook page.

Left-wing extremists use electronic means of communication as a resource for "mobilization and revolution", for example in regard to demonstrations. They use independent Internet platforms such as Indymedia Deutschland and linksunten.indymedia to establish a "counter-public" free of "state controls and capitalist interests" and above all to publish explanations for their actions or letters claiming responsibility for them.

Left- and right-wing extremists post videos, some of which contain war-like sequences of images, to canvass support for their demonstrations, an effect that is manifestly aimed at emotionalizing their activities and getting people to join in.

The Internet platform Altermedia Deutschland is one example of a website that is used for right-wing extremist agitation and propaganda on a particularly massive scale; it was placed on the restricted list in 2012. As well as containing reports on current affairs that are biased to right-wing

extremist ideology, it also contains positive comments on activities and events in the right-wing extremist scene.

The Internet provides multifarious sources of inspiration and instructions that, once the respective ideology has been stripped away, can be used by any extremist terrorist group. Groups of various persuasions can learn from one another, at least as far as the *modus operandi* of militant activities are concerned.

These new technologies mean that the variations on agitation and radicalization are changing: The Internet is becoming the catalyst for new extremist structures, the germ cell for new forms of action in the real world.

The medium will continue to gain in importance when it comes to disseminating extremist propaganda, as a communication platform and, not least, for coordinating activities, a development the security authorities must counter with the appropriate means.

Espionage and other intelligence activities

Foreign intelligence services continue to invest a great deal of organizational effort and expense in espionage against Germany. The country is of interest to them in its role as a geopolitical actor, as a member of NATO and the EU and, finally, on account of its economic strength and its innovative business enterprises. Oppositional groups from the intelligence services' home countries are another target of these espionage activities.

Most **foreign intelligence activity against Germany** is carried out by the services of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. However, other intelligence services also conduct activities aimed at Germany. The second half of 2013 was marked by accusations of espionage activities by the United States of America in particular as revealed in the files leaked by Edward Snowden.

Espionage against Germany is carried out using both human sources and technical means, both openly and conspiratorially.

Intelligence staff are assigned to the official or semi-official missions of other countries in Germany. They run intelligence bases known as legal residencies in these missions. Intelligence officers contact target persons from their vantage point in these bases and use them to get hold of the information they require.

However, it is not only these legal residencies the foreign intelligence services use for their intelligence-gathering. On their own sovereign territory they have wide-ranging rights and possibilities for acquiring information about foreign nationals. Intelligence officers from the services' headquarters also travel to third countries on reconnaissance trips and for meetings.

The Russian intelligence services continue to employ so-called illegals, intelligence service staff with false identities who are infiltrated into target countries. Under good cover they are able to carry out long-term espionage missions or temporarily pursue specific intelligence activities as "travelling illegals".

In our digital age information-gathering using technical means is gaining increasing importance. Counter-espionage is faced with particular

challenges on account of **cyber espionage** by foreign intelligence services. They include technological, legal and analytical challenges, especially given the fact that **cyber attacks** can be used for both espionage and sabotage. The protection of critical infrastructures is thus becoming increasingly important.

However, the growing influence of cyber espionage by no means signifies that human sources are becoming any less significant. Today, an “insider”, in the right place, can gain access to such a wealth of information that not even an entire network of agents would have been able to gather in the past.

In addition, some countries try to get hold of technologies that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. They try to draw a veil over control measures in the export countries by making deliveries via third countries, or to circumvent them by procuring goods that can be used for both civil and military purposes (known as dual-use goods). The term **proliferation** refers to the spread of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction and/or products used for their manufacture, as well as their corresponding carriers (e.g. missiles, drones), including the required expertise.

Given its status as a leading industrial nation, Germany is an important target for proliferation-related procurement efforts. The activities of Iran and North Korea in particular give great cause for concern.

However, Germany’s role in technology and research whets other appetites too. Foreign countries and their intelligence services try to gather information and expertise in manifold ways in order to achieve competitive advantages for their own economies and to catch up with Germany in the field of technology as fast as possible.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to **protection against industrial espionage** and its aim, namely to protect German expertise in order to have a competitive advantage. The domestic intelligence services of the Federation and the *Länder* (federal states) therefore deem it their duty to counter such threats, including pre-emptively.

The Scientology Organization (SO)

The membership of the Scientology Organization (SO) has been declining since 2009. The domestic intelligence services estimate that the SO had around 4,000 members in 2013 (2012: 3,500 to 4,500).

Regional strongholds in Germany are still Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia and the greater Hamburg metropolitan area. Relatively large numbers of SO members live in Hesse and Lower Saxony as well. In general, a reduction in SO activities has been observed.

The SO, which portrays itself as an apolitical religious organization, rejects democracy and the rule of law. Its long-term goal is to have exclusive authority over a social order in which basic human rights are limited or non-existent. The SO hopes to achieve this ultimate political aim with a longterm strategy of expansion. With this in mind, the SO continued its regional activities to recruit new members again in 2013. As in previous years, these activities usually met with minimal acceptance. The SO makes intensive use of the Internet as a central platform for its propaganda and recruitment. It attempts to reach young people directly with a variety of multimedia offerings, such as its “Youth for Human Rights” campaign. The campaigns of the SO sub-organization Kommission für Verstöße der Psychiatrie gegen Menschenrechte (KVPM, Commission for psychiatry’s violations of human rights) are intended to defame psychiatrists and psychologists in particular.

Notes

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